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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared 
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of 
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24 was 
established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating 
strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international 
financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within 
the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries. 
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization 
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in 
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial 
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce 
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional 
reform. 
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings 
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers 
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of 
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) 
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. 
 
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support 
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from 
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24. IMF VOTING REFORM: 
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New Economics Foundation (nef)
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Abstract
The IMF’s economically-weighted voting system gives rise to a major asymmetry of political power, 
both directly and indirectly, and to serious systemic inertia. The increasing financial pressure on the 
Fund, a credible “walk-away” threat by “emerging market” economies, and the potential for effective 
domestic pressure in developed countries together provide an important opportunity for change.
Options for voting reform are assessed as prospective bases for a common developing country 
position:
increasing the basic vote within the current quota system; • 
alternative quota formulae proposed by Cooper (GDP plus variability), the EU (GDP plus openness)  • 
and Buira (GDP at purchasing power parity plus variability);
votes proportional to population and to the square and cube roots of population; • 
a greatly increased basic vote, with the remainder of the vote directly proportional to population;  • 
and 
the Mirakhor and Zaidi proposal (an increased basic vote, a population-weighted vote and inclusion  • 
of “demand” variables in the quota formulae).
Each option is assessed against the post-Singapore scenario as a baseline, using statistical indicators 
of the distribution of votes to test against eight criteria:
congruence with democratic principles; • 
adequacy of representation for all member countries; • 
avoidance of domination by one country or country grouping; • 
proportionality of differences in votes between countries; • 
appropriate balance between “creditor” and “borrowing” countries; • 
adequacy of representation for all country groups; • 
potential for a relatively symmetrical constituency system; and • 
broad acceptability to developing countries. • 
The paper proposes a long-term strategy for developing countries, aimed at combining the political 
strengths of low- and middle-income countries (in providing a moral case for reform and a credible 
“walk-away” threat respectively). It proposes as an opening position and long-term objective splitting 
the three functions of IMF quotas, on the grounds of the fundamental changes in the Fund’s membership, 
nature and role, and in political culture, since it was established in 1944; and the weighting of votes 
exclusively on population, recommending the square root of population as the preferred basis.
It also outlines a common fall-back strategy based on combination of:
the maximum attainable increase in the basic vote; • 
introduction of a second basic vote proportional to population; • 
modification of the quota formula to redistribute quotas in favour of developing countries; and • 
sustained efforts to increase the share of the first two components to 25 per cent or 33 per cent of  • 
the total vote.ix IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options 
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The primary purpose of this paper is to assess 
the alternative options available for voting reform in 
the International Monetary Fund from the perspec-
tive of developing countries, as a first step towards 
establishing a common developing country position 
in the current (and future) Quota Reviews. It assesses 
each of the major options against a number of criteria, 
developing and using statistical indicators wherever 
possible.
While it is primarily a technical paper, how-
ever, the political nature of the underlying objective 
requires it to extend beyond a purely technical 
analysis. In order to establish criteria and to make 
an assessment of the available options, it therefore 
also considers:
  •  the reasons underlying the need for voting re-
form;
  •  the political and institutional obstacles to voting 
reform, and to the establishment of a common 
position among developing countries; and
  •  a possible long-term political strategy for devel-
oping countries, as a broader context for their 
short-term positioning.
1.  Asymmetry in voting weights in the IMF
The Fund’s economically weighted voting sys-
tem is a central feature of its governance structure. 
Each country’s vote is equal to a quota, based on its 
weight in the global economy (which also determines 
its financial contribution to, and access to borrowing 
from, the Fund), and a basic vote which is equal for 
every country. This was a (rather unequal) compro-
mise between two factions at the Bretton Woods 
Conference, respectively preferring a one-member-
one-vote system and voting based purely on the size 
of each country’s economy. 
While basic votes significantly increase the 
votes of a few very small economies compared with 
a purely quota-based voting system, the failure to 
increase their relative size since 1944, while Fund 
quotas have increased by a factor of 37 and member-
ship only by a factor of four, has greatly reduced their 
significance (Buira, 2003a). Basic votes currently 
account for just 2.1 per cent of the votes in the IMF, 
compared with 11.3 per cent originally (IMF, 2003, 
table 4). The relative decline in the basic vote “has 
substantially shifted the balance of power in favour of 
large-quota countries. ... Consequently, the voice of 
small countries in discussions has been substantially 
weakened and their participation in decision-making 
made negligible” (Buira, 2003a: 15).
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The result of the weighted voting system is that 
the developed countries,1 which account for 20 per 
cent of Fund members and 15 per cent of the world’s 
population, have a substantial majority (60.4 per cent) 
of the votes. The developing countries, by contrast, 
are seriously under-represented relative to their 
share both of membership of population. The whole 
of sub-Saharan Africa has only 4.6 per cent of the 
votes in the Fund, fewer than the United States, Ja-
pan, Germany, France or the United Kingdom, while 
Luxembourg (population 500,000) has twice as many 
votes as Ethiopia (population 70,000,000).
The weighted voting system also gives the 
United States alone, and any four other G7 members 
acting together without the United States, sufficient 
votes to block policy decisions in the 18 areas requir-
ing a qualified majority of 85 per cent of the votes. 
The use of such vetoes is by no means unknown:
Special majorities have been used to block 
decisions supported by an absolute majority 
of votes on increases in the size of the IMF 
(that is, quota increases) and on SDR alloca-
tions, sales of the IMF’s vast gold holdings 
and policies on access to IMF resources. The 
special-majority requirement has had the effect 
of inhibiting the discussion of even the impor-
tant and difficult issues (Buira, 2003a: 18).
By contrast, all sub-Saharan African countries 
(including South Africa) and all other low-income 
countries (including India), though accounting for 
nearly one-third of the Fund’s membership and 
40 per cent of the world’s population, together have 
only 8.3 per cent of the vote – little more than half of 
what would be required to block a vote on the most 
stringent qualified majority requirement.
2.  Additional sources of asymmetry 
related to weighted voting
The inequality in power between developed and 
developing countries in the Executive Board resulting 
from the weighted voting system is compounded by a 
number of other features of the Board’s operation.
2.1  Constituencies
Representation on the Executive Boards of the 
Fund and the Bank substantially reflects the weighted 
votes of the members. The holders of the five largest 
IMF quotas – the United States, Japan, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom – are entitled to ap-
point their own Executive Directors in both the Fund 
and the Bank. Other Directors are “elected” by the 
Board of Governors every two years at the Annual 
Meetings, through a constituency system (although 
there are currently three countries – China, the Rus-
sian Federation and Saudi Arabia – which each forms 
a constituency in its own right in the Bank and the 
Fund, and is consequently able to “elect” its own 
Executive Director).
Voting power analysis indicates that the weight-
ed voting system gives the United States greater 
power even than its share of votes. Leech and Leech 
(2003) estimate the United States voting power as 
20.4 per cent in the Board of Governors and 21.5 per 
cent in the Executive Board, compared with a voting 
share of 17.1 per cent. The voting power of all other 
countries and of all other Executive Directors is found 
to be less than their respective voting weights.
Many developing countries are in constituencies 
which also include developed countries – and their 
relative voting power within these constituencies is 
diminished by the weighted voting system. The under-
representation of developing countries is thus further 
exacerbated by the inability of Executive Directors 
to split their votes, particularly as “the Director’s 
position will normally reflect that of his country or 
the majority of the votes in the constituency” (Buira, 
2003a), and developed countries also tend to domi-
nate the position of Executive Director by virtue of 
their larger votes. Thus the Commonwealth Carib-
bean countries are represented by a Canadian Director 
in a constituency overwhelmingly dominated by 
Canada and Ireland, while Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Turkey are represented by a Belgian Director in a 
constituency dominated by EU members.
In all but one such “mixed” (developed/develop-
ing country) constituencies, high-income countries 
have both the largest single vote and an absolute 
majority of the total constituency votes, in three 
cases exceeding 90 per cent of the total (Rustomjee, 
2005). The sole exception is the constituency includ-
ing Spain, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Mexico. As a result, eleven Executive Directors 
are currently from developed countries, two from 
other high-income countries, five from upper-middle-
income countries, four from lower-middle-income 
countries, and only two from low-income countries. 3 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
Directors representing only high-income countries, 
or constituencies dominated by them, account for 
66.7 per cent of the total votes.
A large proportion of the membership is entirely 
disempowered by the constituency system. Applying 
voting analysis, Leech and Leech (2003) find that, 
even if constituencies operated on a democratic basis, 
the need to cast votes as a single block would leave 
41 countries (22.3 per cent of the membership, with 
4.4 per cent of the votes in the Fund and 5.5 per cent 
in the Bank) entirely powerless. Three of these (Por-
tugal, Ireland and Greece) are developed countries; 
the remaining 38 are developing countries.
Even in the case of constituencies made up 
entirely of developing countries, there is generally 
a mix of income levels, circumstances and inter-
ests among the members, making coordination of 
positions even within the constituency a complex, 
time-consuming and potentially intractable task. 
This is again exacerbated by the very small votes 
attributable to developing (especially low-income) 
countries, which requires a considerable number of 
countries to establish sufficient votes to form a viable 
constituency.
Thus the countries of sub-Saharan Africa (except 
Ghana) are divided between two constituencies, with 
24 and 19 members respectively. The former, though 
the largest constituency, also has the smallest share 
of votes by a substantial margin, at 1.41 per cent. 
The latter has a larger vote (3.00 per cent) largely by 
virtue of South Africa and Nigeria being members. 
However, this creates a potential tension between the 
interests of South Africa, as an upper-middle-income 
emerging market economy with 29 per cent of the 
constituency vote, Nigeria as a large low-income oil 
exporter with 27 per cent of the vote, and 17 other 
mostly low-income and oil-importing countries with 
a total of 44 per cent of the vote.
While constituency practices vary, large constit-
uencies may also limit the ability of elected Directors 
to hold the management and staff to account, through 
the rotation of the Directorship among member coun-
tries. This usually occurs every two or four years 
depending on the constituency, while staff and Man-
agement typically remain in position for longer. This 
gives the latter the additional advantages of greater 
continuity, stronger and longer-standing networks 
and greater familiarity with the institution.
2.2  Asymmetric accountability
While Executive Directors are appointed (or 
“elected”) by, and effectively cast the votes of, particu-
lar member countries in the Executive Boards, “there 
are virtually no mechanisms for holding an elected 
Director to account within the IMF itself, or among 
the members of a constituency, once a Director has 
been elected” (Woods and Lombardi, 2006). Moreo-
ver, while an appointed Directorship remains within 
the control of the appointing government, “a member 
that elected or helped to elect an executive director 
has no right to terminate his service” (Gold, 1974). 
More generally, according to the IMF’s Chief 
Counsel, Executive Directors are not representatives 
of these countries, but rather officials of the Fund 
or Bank.
The fact that [an Executive Director] has been 
selected by certain member states does not 
create an obligation for him to defer to their 
views or to cast his vote in accordance with 
their instructions (Gianviti, 1999: 48).
Appointed Directors, however, typically receive 
(and follow) instructions on the positions they should 
take in Board meetings from the governments which 
appoint them, and face the sanction of removal (as 
well as risks to future career prospects, since most are 
career public servants). While some elected Directors 
(notably the Director for the Scandinavian-Baltic 
constituency) also receive instructions from their 
constituents, in practice they have much greater 
discretion in how they interpret (and whether they 
follow) such instructions; and consultation with 
constituency members is often informal and sporadic, 
making the representation of constituents’ interests 
and views much more indirect and less assured 
(Woods and Lombardi, 2006).
Since all appointed Directors are from devel-
oped countries, the different relationship of appointed 
and elected Directors to the governments which 
appoint and elect them further shifts the balance of 
representation away from developing countries (and 
other developed countries), as their interests are less 
directly and reliably represented.4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
2.3  Workload and resources
A further important consideration for Executive 
Directors with constituencies including a substan-
tial number of developing countries is workload, 
as Directors and their staffs have considerable ad-
ditional responsibilities in relation to programme/
project negotiations and reviews, staff missions and 
country-specific Board discussions. While staffing 
levels to some extent reflect the number of countries 
in each constituency, they do not take account of 
the very different nature and intensities of IMF and 
World Bank relationships with different countries 
(Rustomjee, 2005). 
As a result,
those Directors each representing 20 countries 
or more are barely able to attend to the copious 
amounts of bilateral business with the IMF of 
the countries they represent ... This provides 
little time to devote to the consideration of 
systemic policy issues (Buira, 2003b: 233).
While this constraint may have been eased to 
some extent by the appointment in 2003 of an ad-
ditional three technical advisers to each of the two 
African Executive Directors’ offices, it is unclear how 
effectively this has resolved the problem.
The workload issue makes it particularly dif-
ficult for Directors whose very limited votes make 
them dependent on moral suasion and building a 
compelling case to undertake the analysis and net-
working with other Board members necessary to do 
so (Rustomjee, 2005). An appointed Director for a 
developed country, by contrast, has a comparatively 
minimal workload arising from constituency busi-
ness, and generally considerably more technical 
support from his or her authorities, allowing a much 
more substantive and considered input into policy 
discussions.
2.4  Coordination
A major consideration in the political dynamics 
of the Executive Board – as in other decision-making 
bodies – is coordination between groups of Directors; 
and this further increases the inequality between 
developed and developing countries, as coordination 
among developing countries is more limited, less 
cohesive and less effective than that of the G7 and 
the EU (Woods and Lombardi, 2006). The develop-
ing country-Executive Directors to the Fund meet 
periodically as the “Group of 11” (G11), to discuss 
their respective positions, and their Governors also 
meet informally at the Spring- and Annual Meetings. 
However, the Group’s ability to coordinate its posi-
tion is limited by the heterogeneity of developing 
countries interests on many issues, compounded 
by problems of workload and intra-constituency 
coordination (Woods and Lombardi, 2006). In total, 
the G11 Directors account for only 30.4 per cent of 
the votes in the IMF, and in order to secure even a 
simple majority in the Board would need, not only 
to be unanimous in their position, but also to secure 
the support of at least five of the other six non-G7 
Directors.
3.  Systemic inertia
As well as disempowering IMF’s developing 
country membership, the weighted voting system 
also gives rise to a major problem of systemic iner-
tia, as those countries on which it confers power are 
able to use that power to preserve those aspects of 
the system which benefit them. This is particularly 
problematic in a context where the beneficiaries have 
a substantial absolute majority of the total votes, and 
the most powerful single player has a de facto veto 
over any decision which would substantially change 
the distribution of power.
Thus,
However clear the argument, the obstacles 
to achieving [institutional reform] are very 
significant indeed. Meaningful change can 
only be made with the consent of the industrial 
countries, which hold a majority of the voting 
power in the IMF Executive Board and of 
course in the IMF Board of Governors. And 
these members currently see little benefit in 
changing the status quo (Rustomjee, 2005).
Rustomjee (2005) cites as an example the 
completion of the Twelfth Quota Review in 2003 
without increasing quotas (or therefore making any 
progress in correcting quota imbalances), which, 
he argues “highlights the considerable inertia in the 
quota and voting process and the reluctance of the 
largest shareholders to make changes to the quota 
and voting arrangements”. He concludes:
All potential options require political consensus 
among the membership and the preservation of 5 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
the factors to which creditors attach significant 
importance, including the principle of creditor 
majority, the United States and European veto 
power and relative ranking among creditors 
(Rustomjee, 2005).
As Buira observes,
The challenge is ... to overcome the vested 
interests and resistance of major industrialised 
countries to giving up control, and of some 
others to giving up certain ‘acquired rights’, 
particularly regarding voting power and rep-
resentation on the Executive Board.
Such “acquired rights” include, for example, 
the ad hoc quota increase in 1983, which selectively 
doubled the quotas (and thus nearly doubled the 
votes) of major oil exporting countries in the light of 
the 1970s oil price increases, and the decisions to al-
low Saudi Arabia, China and the Russian Federation, 
though not entitled to appointed Executive Directors, 
to form constituencies in their own right, and thus 
have their own “elected” Directors.
The quota system, and in particular the extent 
of discretion available to the Executive Board and 
the use of weighted votes in the setting of quotas, is 
central to this inertia, as the Executive Board exer-
cises a considerable degree of discretion in setting 
new quotas.
Despite the use of formulae in quota reviews, 
their outcome is less the product of a technical exer-
cise than of a political bargaining process among the 
major members. Thus, for example, the last change 
in quotas, in 2003, resulted in the United Kingdom 
and France each having exactly 107,635 votes, and 
Canada and China exactly 63,942 votes, while the 
Ninth General Quota Review in 1990 gave Germany 
and Japan equal votes. These are not merely the co-
incidental results of a set of objective calculations, 
but rather the carefully managed result of political 
negotiations between the governments concerned, 
none of which was willing to accept a result which 
gave it fewer votes than another member with which 
its government felt it should (at least) have parity. 
This phenomenon, of quotas being politically 
determined, but justified ex post by reference to 
ostensibly neutral formulae specifically designed to 
produce the intended result, dates back to the origins 
of the Fund. Raymond Mikesell, who produced the 
formula for the initial allocation of quotas in 1943 
(which is still one of the five formulae in use today, 
and from which the other four differ only in the 
relative weights of different variables), received in-
structions from chief United States negotiator Harry 
Dexter White
to give the United States a quota of approxi-
mately $2.9 billion; the United Kingdom (in-
cluding its colonies), about half the U.S. quota; 
the Soviet Union an amount just under that of 
the United Kingdom; and China, somewhat 
less, [and for] the total of the quotas to be about 
$10 billion (Mikesell, 1994: 22).
Mikesell duly followed these instructions, later 
recalling that, when asked how the figures were ar-
rived at,
I ... gave a rambling twenty-minute seminar on 
the factors taken into account in calculating the 
quotas, but I did not reveal the formula. I tried 
to make the process appear as scientific as pos-
sible, but the delegates were intelligent enough 
to know that the process was more political 
than scientific (Mikesell, 1994: 35–36).
In principle, a large enough block of develop-
ing country members would be able to block a quota 
review if it were not in their interests. However, the 
size of the block required would be much greater for 
smaller and poorer than for larger and better-off de-
veloping countries. Thus a coalition of the nine largest 
“emerging” economies in terms of IMF votes (South 
Africa, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Russian Federation 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), acting 
together, could in principle prevent a quota review 
from securing the requisite 85 per cent majority. By 
contrast, the entire of sub-Saharan Africa (exclud-
ing South Africa, whose interests in this respect are 
closer to those of the “emerging markets”) has only 
one-quarter (3.72 per cent) of the 15 per cent of votes 
required for a blocking majority, and all low-income 
countries (excluding India, for similar reasons) less 
than one-third (4.91 per cent). By contrast, as noted 
above, even a coalition of all sub-Saharan and all 
low-income countries (including India and South 
Africa) would have little more than half the votes 
required (8.3 per cent).
It is noteworthy in this context that the reso-
lution of the Board of Governors on developing 
countries’ voice and votes was approved against the 
opposition of 23 countries accounting for 9.6 per 
cent of the votes. This is more opposition than could 6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
have been mustered by unanimous opposition by all 
sub-Saharan and low-income countries.
Even if those adversely affected by the weighted 
voting system could, in principle, assemble a large 
enough coalition to block a quota review, the situation 
is complicated by the multi-functional nature of IMF 
quotas, in simultaneously determining voting power, 
access to lending, and financial contributions to the 
two agencies, because of the incentives this creates 
for developed and developing countries with respect 
to quotas, as discussed in section 13.1 below.
The problem of political inertia is illustrated by 
the resistance by major shareholders to efforts to pro-
tect or restore the level of basic votes. While the issue 
of the erosion of basic votes has been recognized as a 
source of concern in the IMF since the Eighth Quota 
Review in 1983, only now are there signs that it is 
being even partially addressed. It should also be noted 
that even doubling the basic vote to 4.2 per cent of 
the total, as pledged at the 2006 Annual Meetings, 
would leave it well below its level when concern was 
first expressed about the issue (5.6 per cent).
The 23-year delay in addressing the issue of the 
erosion of basic votes appears to be a direct result of 
opposition from major developed countries whose 
domination of voting would be somewhat reduced as 
a result. Thus in 2003, the then United States Execu-
tive Director to the World Bank wrote:
We reject the proposal to increase the number 
of basic votes…. The increase in developing 
countries’ share of votes… would do more 
harm than good and, in our view, would be 
inconsistent with the principle that shares in 
the IFIs [international financial institutions] 
should reflect economic weights in the world 
economy…. Giving population and other fac-
tors a weight in voting strength would create 
a radically different, less desirable and non-
financial structure for the Bank (Brookins, 
2003, quoted in Wade, 2005).
4.  The need and opportunity for 
reform
IMF voting reform is a critically important issue 
for the developing world. The dominance of devel-
oped countries within the Fund largely determines 
the nature of its activities, which in turn influences 
the nature of the international financial system and 
its implications for development (in terms of the 
availability, stability and cost of external financing, 
the effectiveness of crisis avoidance and response, 
etc). Through its central role both in establishing the 
principle of conditionality and in determining the 
way in which it has been applied (in general and in 
individual programmes), the Fund’s voting structure 
also has major implications for economic and social 
policies in countries which borrow from the Fund. For 
some developing countries, notably in sub-Saharan 
Africa, borrowing from the Fund, and therefore the 
IMF role in policy-making, has been more or less 
continuous for 20–25 years.
IMF voting reform is also important as a prec-
edent. Although there is no formal link, changes in 
voting weights in the World Bank have historically 
followed those in the IMF. Moreover, the strength of 
criticism of the WTO’s decision-making processes 
(e.g. Jawara and Kwa, 2004), and the highly problem-
atic course of the current round of trade negotiations, 
arguably make the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
an institution in search of a viable governance struc-
ture. If a solution could be found for the IMF which 
combined the smaller and more effective decision-
making structure of the Fund’s Executive Board with 
an appropriate balance of power between developed 
and developing countries (and between developing 
regions and country groupings), it could in principle 
provide a more viable alternative model for the in-
ternational trading system.
The current IMF Quota Review, scheduled for 
completion by January 2008 provides a major op-
portunity for reform, with substantial changes more 
firmly on the agenda perhaps than ever before. The 
issue of governance reform in the IMF and World 
Bank is also receiving much greater attention than 
in the past, as a result, partly of the Quota Review, 
but also of other developments, such as the contro-
versial appointment (in effect by the United States 
Government, following historical “tradition”) of Paul 
Wolfowitz as President of the World Bank, and the 
divided vote on the “voice and vote” resolution at 
the 2006 Annual Meetings.
The financial problems facing the IMF, as a 
result of the reluctance of many developing countries 
to accept IMF conditionality, also provides an impor-
tant opportunity, both in terms of public awareness 
of the issue, but also more directly. Together with 
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of many emerging market economies, notably in 
Asia, and major oil exporting countries, this makes 
a scenario in which major economies “walk away” 
from the Fund both a possibility and a threat to its 
continued operation, at least in its current form. This 
possibility would probably be viewed with serious 
concern by developed country governments, who 
value the IMF in part as a means of exerting policy 
pressure on developing countries, and particularly 
successful emerging market economies. Perhaps for 
the first time in its history, at least some developing 
countries are in a position to create a credible and 
viable alternative to the IMF; and this gives them the 
potential for considerable negotiating power, if they 
are willing to use it.
The position of supporters of democratic reform 
is further strengthened by the growing role and rheto-
ric of parts of the international community in relation 
to democracy. As well as the commitment of devel-
oped countries to democratic principles domestically, 
the IMF and World Bank are placing increasing 
emphasis on the importance of “good governance” in 
developing countries; and the United States, in par-
ticular, regularly refers to an objective of “spreading 
democracy” in defence of its foreign policy. The stark 
contrast of the democratic principles they observe, 
and claim to promote internationally, with the lack 
of democracy in the system they seek to defend (and 
from which they benefit) internationally, is potentially 
a major weakness in their position. Moreover, the 
principles of democracy are well understood, and 
almost universally accepted among electorates in 
developed countries, so that this weakness is much 
easier to exploit in order to generate public pressure 
than on more technical economic issues such as debt 
cancellation or trade policies.
The implications of these considerations are 
discussed further in section 14.1.
5.  Reform and assessment criteria
The following sections assess a number of op-
tions for voting weights in the IMF. These are divided 
between:
the  •  minimal commitment following the 2007 
IMF Annual Meeting in Singapore: continuation 
of current quotas, with ad hoc adjustments for 
four countries (China, the Republic of Korea, 
Mexico and Turkey), together with a doubling 
of the basic vote;
a larger increase in the basic vote, considering  • 
three alternative levels (11.3 per cent, 25 per 
cent and 50 per cent of total votes);
alternative quota formulas (those proposed by  • 
the Cooper Commission, the European Union, 
and Ariel Buira);
proposals based on democratic principles  • 
(votes directly proportional to population, or 
to the square or cube root of population, and 
alternative splits between a basic vote and a 
population-weighted vote); and
the “mixed” approach proposed by Mirakhor  • 
and Zaidi (2006), which combines a modified 
quota with two basic votes, based respectively 
on a one-country-one vote principle and direct 
proportionality to population.
In the sections which follow, each of the above 
proposals is assessed, using the first (the minimal 
post-Singapore scenario as a baseline for compari-
son.
Much of this assessment is necessarily subjective 
in nature. However, in order to make the assessment 
as rigorous as possible, a number of specific criteria 
are proposed, and statistical indicators have been de-
veloped to assess the proposals against these criteria 
wherever possible. These criteria and indicators are 
outlined in the remainder of this section.
5.1  Congruence with democratic principles
A key feature of any system of governance is the 
extent of its conformity with basic principles of de-
mocracy. Here we propose that the standards applied 
should be those commonly accepted in democratic 
processes at the country level. These can be divided 
into three broad principles:
(a)  representation broadly proportional to popula-
tion, through either:
•  division of the population into approximately 
equal groups, usually by geographical area, 
each of which has an equal number of rep-
resentatives (e.g. the United States Congress 
or the United Kingdom House of Commons); 
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•  division of the population into unequal groups, 
each with a number of representatives ap-
proximately proportional to its population; 
(b)  equal representation between historically or cul-
turally defined geographical areas, irrespective 
of population (e.g. the United States Senate); 
and
(c)  pooling of votes from all geographical areas on 
an equal basis (e.g. United States Presidential 
elections).
At the international level, (b) is also used in the 
United Nations system and (in principle) the WTO. 
Another option also arises at the international level 
(for example in the European Union), between (a) 
and (b):
(d)  votes varying broadly in line with population, 
but increasingly less than proportionally, or with 
a minimum number of votes per country, so that 
smaller countries have a share of the vote greater 
than their population share, and larger countries 
have a share less than their share of population, 
possibly with additional protection offered by a 
veto for every country.
In the following sections, each option is as-
sessed, first, according to the proportion of the vote 
which is based explicitly on one or more of these 
principles; and second, according to the extent to 
which its outcomes conform to the implications 
of the principles. The latter is judged by a “demo-
cratic shortfall”, defined as 100 per cent minus the 
proportion of the vote which is explicitly based on 
one-member- or one-person-one vote principles, mi-
nus the remaining proportion of the vote multiplied 
by the correlation coefficient between countries’ 
residual votes and their population.
5.2  Adequate representation for all 
individual countries 
A second important consideration is that every 
country should have adequate representation to en-
able it to have a potential influence on decisions. 
Rigorous assessment of this requires a voting power 
analysis, which is beyond the scope of the present 
paper (and would in any case depend critically on 
the exact composition of constituencies). Discus-
sion is therefore necessarily indicative rather than 
definitive. 
In our assessment, we consider as indicators the 
smallest share of the vote of any country, and those 
at the 90th and 80th percentiles.
5.3  Avoidance of domination by one country 
or country grouping
A third criterion is that no one country or small 
group of countries should be able to determine the 
outcome of decisions, to the exclusion of others, 
including by veto power, unless this is shared on an 
equal basis. (NB how many countries constitute a 
“small” group in this context is a matter of subjec-
tive judgment.)
In order to assess options against this criterion, 
the following indicators are applied:
the shares of the vote attributable to the G7 and  • 
the EU (as the most pro-active country group-
ings in terms of coordination of IMF positions) 
and of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD); and
the smallest number of countries required to  • 
achieve a majority (50 per cent +1) of the votes, 
or a blocking majority on major policy issues 
(15 per cent+1).
5.4  Proportionality of difference between 
countries
A further factor for consideration is the scale of 
differences between the votes of different countries 
between the top and the bottom of the scale. Again, 
this is a matter of subjective judgment, requiring 
consideration of what is likely to be accepted as 
equitable and/or politically feasible.
In order to provide a basis for such a judgement, 
two indicators are used:
the inter-quartile range of country votes pro- • 
duced by each option; and
in the case of population-based voting systems,  • 
the inter-quartile range of votes divided by the 
ratio between the populations of the countries 
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(The latter is considered an unreliable indicator 
in the context of quota-based systems, as the ranking 
of countries does not correspond with population 
rankings. This means that the value of this indicator 
is critically dependent on which countries are located 
at the 25th and 75th percentiles.)
Asymmetries in the differentiation of votes at 
the top and bottom of the scale are also considered 
on an ad hoc basis where these are substantial.
5.5  Appropriate balance between “creditor” 
and “borrowing” countries
While the Fund began as a credit union, all 
of whose members were both creditors and poten-
tial borrowers, as it has expanded and evolved, its 
membership has become polarized between a group 
of (developed and other high-income) creditors and 
actual or potential (low- and middle-income) bor-
rowers (see section 13.2). On many issues, such as 
the size of the Fund and the terms and conditions of 
lending, there are fundamental differences of interest 
between these two groups. This dichotomy makes the 
question of the balance of power between the two 
groups a fundamental consideration.
What represents an appropriate balance between 
“creditor” and “borrowing” countries is again a mat-
ter for subjective judgment, which may be guided 
by different principles. We therefore consider three 
indicators under this heading (taking high-income 
countries as a proxy for structural creditors, and 
low- and middle-income countries as a proxy for 
borrowers): the proportion of votes accounted for by 
high-income countries; and the ratio of the average 
vote of high-income countries relative to low- and 
middle-income countries on a per country and a per 
capita basis.
5.6  Adequacy of representation for all 
country groups 
Among “borrowing” countries in particular, 
there are also important sub-groups affected by the 
Fund’s activities and operations in different ways. 
This is partly a product of eligibility for the Fund 
facilities currently available (e.g. the Poverty Redac-
tion and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC Initiative). 
While these are in turn a product of the current voting 
system, they are nonetheless a useful way of consid-
ering this issue, as a reflection of more fundamental 
divisions between countries with different needs in 
terms of their levels of development and financial 
situations (particularly in terms of liquidity versus 
solvency problems).
Adequacy of representation for each category 
is important to ensure that decisions applying to a 
particular group of countries (e.g. those eligible for 
a particular facility) have a sufficient influence over 
decisions to ensure that they take full account of their 
concerns and interests. 
Here, we consider four indicators – the propor-
tion of votes attributable to:
countries in principle eligible for the HIPC  • 
Initiative;
countries eligible for the PRGF but not for the  • 
HIPC Initiative;
low- and middle-income countries not eligible  • 
for the PRGF; and
transition economies (defined as countries in  • 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union).
Each of these indicators is considered in relation 
to the share of each group in the membership of the 
IMF and the total population of IMF member coun-
tries, and to the 15 per cent vote required to block 
major policy decisions. In the last case, however, it 
should be noted that both HIPC countries and transi-
tion economies have a population share well below 
15 per cent (at 8.7 per cent and 6.3 per cent respec-
tively), the former also constituting slightly less than 
15 per cent of the membership (14.7 per cent).
5.7  Symmetry of constituencies 
If we take as given the Executive Board structure 
(or more generally the need for a decision-making 
body representing the whole membership, but with-
out all members having their own representatives), 
the nature of the constituency system which can be 
supported with a particular distribution of votes is 
also of importance. This is highlighted by the consid-
erations of work-load and asymmetric accountability 
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This paper takes this to require the possibility of 
combining three potentially conflicting features:
relative equality of voting shares between con- • 
stituencies;
relative equality of workloads between Direc- • 
tors (taken to imply relative equality between 
constituencies in terms of numbers of coun-
tries); and
all constituencies containing few enough coun- • 
tries to allow each Director to be effectively 
accountable to all constituents.
To assess the symmetry of constituencies, we 
assume implicitly that the membership is divided into 
constituencies which are as equal as possible in size. 
This is done as follows.
Country votes are placed in descending order. • 
If the largest vote is greater than one-twenty- • 
fourth of the total (assuming an Executive Board 
of the current size), the country concerned is des-
ignated as a “single-country constituency”.
The largest vote is deducted from the total,  • 
which is divided by 23, to establish the average 
size of the remaining constituencies.
The second largest vote is compared with the  • 
resulting figure. If larger, the country concerned 
is again designated as a “single-country con-
stituency”.
This process is repeated, until the next country’s  • 
vote is less than the calculated average for the 
remaining constituencies.
Countries other than “single-country constitu- • 
encies” which have a vote greater than half the 
average for all such countries are designated as 
“constituency-dominant countries”.
Finally, the cumulative total of votes is esti- • 
mated, starting from the bottom of the distri-
bution, to determine at what point it reaches 
one-twenty-fourth of the total. This indicates 
the maximum number of countries which could 
be required to form a constituency of average 
size.
From this process, three indicators are used to 
assess the extent of asymmetry in the constituency 
system:
the number of “single-country constituencies”; • 
the number of “constituency-dominant coun- • 
tries”; and
the maximum number of countries required to  • 
form a constituency of average size.
5.8  Broad acceptability to developing 
countries
The above criteria assess the appropriateness of 
alternative voting systems. However, if the objective 
is to establish a common position among a broad coa-
lition of developing countries, then its acceptability 
among their governments is a key consideration. 
In part, this will be influenced by the overall 
effects of each proposal, as assessed by the criteria 
outlined in sections 5.1 to 5.7. However, the effects 
on each individual country’s vote are also likely to be 
a significant consideration in its support or opposition 
to a particular proposal. Acceptability is therefore 
assessed on the basis of:
the number of countries whose votes would be  • 
reduced;
their total share in world population (as an in- • 
dicator of the extent to which exclusion from a 
consensus would weaken its legitimacy); and
their total share in current IMF votes (as an  • 
indicator of the effect on a potential coalition’s 
voting power in the current Quota Review).
Consideration is also given to the potential po-
litical significance of countries which are negatively 
affected to a hypothetical coalition of developing 
countries.
5.9  Other political considerations
The final consideration is an assessment of the 
political factors which may contribute to or impede 
the approval of a particular option. This includes the 
total votes represented by countries which would be 
negatively affected. It should be noted that this nec-
essarily skews this criterion towards the interests of 
those countries which have the greatest votes within 
the system as it currently operates. 
Thus, if the self-interest of individual countries 
were the sole determinant of their support or opposi-
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reduced the share in the total votes of countries 
with a total vote in excess of 15 per cent would be 
considered infeasible. This necessarily includes any 
proposal which would reduce the share of the vote of 
the United States, or shifts votes significantly away 
from high- or middle-income (but not low-income) 
countries.
It should be noted, however, that the concept 
of political feasibility is also, in some respects, more 
complex than the other criteria, as it may change 
significantly over time, as political attitudes and 
dynamics change. As awareness of the issue rises, 
the strength of morally-based criteria such as de-
mocracy and institutional effectiveness may increase 
relative to national self-interest. This process could 
be significantly enhanced by activities of the G24, 
international NGOs, etc, over the course of the cur-
rent quota review.
The indicator used here for political is the total 
proportion of votes held by countries whose votes 
would be lower under a particular option than in the 
status quo. This is accompanied by a qualitative discus-
sion of other factors which may strengthen or weaken 
opposition to or support for a particular proposal.
6.   The Singapore baseline
The agreement reached at Singapore on the 
Quota Review process is presented here as a baseline 
for comparison of the other options. This represents 
the status quo ante, modified by ad hoc quota ad-
justments for four countries (China, the Republic of 
Korea, Mexico and Turkey), together with a doubling 
of the share of the basic vote, from 2.1 per cent of 
the total vote to 4.2 per cent.
The results of the assessment of the baseline are 
summarized in table 6.1.
6.1  Congruence with democratic principles
The explicitly democratic component of the vote 
in the current IMF system is limited to the basic vote, 
which is allocated equally to all countries. Under 
the minimal Singapore commitment, this will be 
doubled from 2.1 per cent of the total vote to 4.2 per 
cent. While quotas are significantly correlated with 
population, the correlation coefficient following the 
ad hoc quota increases approved for four countries 
in Singapore is relatively low at 0.346. This indicates 
a democratic shortfall, as defined above, of 62.7 per 
cent.
6.2  Adequate representation for all 
individual countries 
The smallest vote in the IMF at present is that 
of Palau, at 0.02 per cent. Those at the 90th and 80th 
percentiles are respectively 0.03 per cent for Grenada 
and 0.05 per cent for the Central African Republic.
6.3  Avoidance of domination by one  
(or a few) country(s)
The voting system in the baseline scenario is 
heavily dominated by developed country group-
ings. The OECD has a substantial overall majority 
of the vote, at 63.2 per cent, and the G7 alone has 
43.7 per cent. (This is further increased by the fact 
that both G7 member countries without the right to 
appoint their own Directors occupy the Board seat 
for their constituencies on a permanent basis.) The 
27 members of the EU have 31.7 per cent of the total 
vote. The United States alone has sufficient votes to 
block votes requiring an 85 per cent majority; and 
the nine largest votes (those of the G7 members, 
plus Saudi Arabia and China) are sufficient for an 
absolute majority.
6.4  Proportionality of difference between 
countries
The inter-quartile range of votes in the post-Sin-
gapore scenario is higher than most of the alternative 
proposals, at 7.8. While the inter-quartile range 
relative to population is an unreliable indicator for 
systems based on economic weighting, as discussed 
above, the figure of 1.21 is again higher than most 
proposed alternatives.
6.5  Appropriate balance between “creditor” 
and “borrowing” countries
The current system weights votes strongly in 
favour of “creditor” countries. The high-income 
countries together have a substantial majority 
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country’s vote is 7.0 times that of the average low- or 
middle-income country, and their average vote per 
capita is 10.3 times as great.
6.6  Adequacy of representation for all 
country groups
All developing country groupings considered 
(HIPCs, other PRGF-eligible countries, non-PRGF 
Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) and 
transition economies) are under-represented rela-
tive to their respective shares of the membership, 
and all but the last are under-represented relative to 
their shares of population. (Transition economies 
account for 6.3 per cent of population, but 7.7 per 
cent of the vote.) 
HIPCs and other PRGF countries are most 
seriously under-represented, with just 3.1 per cent 
and 5.7 per cent of the vote respectively. This means 
that, even together, they have little more than half the 
votes needed to block a vote under the most stringent 
special majority requirement (8.8 per cent compared 
with 15 per cent), despite making up 42.4 per cent of 
the membership and accounting for 38.3 per cent of 
population. HIPCs are under-represented by a factor 
of seven relative to their share of the membership, 
and by a factor of nearly three relative to population. 
Other PRGF countries are under-represented by a 
Table 6.1





Democratic principles Explicit democratic  link (%) 4.2
“Democratic shortfall” 62.7
Individual country Smallest vote (%) 0.02
representation 90th percentile vote (%) 0.03
80th percentile vote (%) 0.05
Non-dominance G7 vote (%) 43.7 11.3 3.8
EU vote (%) 31.7 7.7 14.7
OECD vote (%) 63.2 18.3 16.3
Countries for 15% +1 1
Countries for 50% +1 9
Proportionality Inter-quartile range 7.8
IQR relative to population 1.2
Debtor/creditor balance High-income country vote (%) 65.3 15.4 21.2
balance HIC/LMIC per country (ratio) 7.0
HIC/LMIC relative to population 10.3
Country group HIPC vote (%) 3.1 8.7 21.7
representation Other PRGF vote (%) 5.7 29.6 20.7
Other developing countries vote (%) 26.0 46.3 36.4
Transition economies vote (%) 7.7 6.3 14.7
Symmetrical Single-country constituencies 6
constituencies Constituency-dominant countries 7
Maximum countries for average
 constituency
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factor of nearly four relative to membership, and 
more than five relative to population.
6.7  Symmetry of constituencies
As discussed above, the current constituency 
system is very asymmetric, seven countries having 
their own Directors. Abstracting from the current 
constituencies, and applying the indicators outlined in 
the previous sectors to the post-Singapore distribution 
of votes, indicates six “single-country constituen-
cies” and a further seven “constituency-dominant 
countries”, together accounting for more than half the 
Board places. It would take the smallest 84 countries 
– 46 per cent of the entire membership – to make up 
a single average-sized constituency. 
6.8  Overall Assessment
Even with the ad hoc quota adjustments agreed 
in Singapore, and a doubling of the basic vote, 
the current system is skewed heavily in favour of 
“creditor” countries as a whole, and the developed 
countries in particular. Both groups have a substantial 
absolute majority of the votes, as does the OECD, 
and “creditor” countries are over-represented rela-
tive to borrowing countries by a factor of 7–10. The 
United States, and the United States alone, has a 
veto over major policy decisions.
At the other end of the scale, it would take nearly 
half the Fund’s members with the smallest votes to 
form a single constituency with an average vote. All 
PRGF countries combined, though accounting for 
around 40 per cent both of the membership and of 
total population and being most affected by many of 
the Fund’s decisions, have only 8.8 per cent of the 
votes, far short of what is needed to block a decision 
on the most stringent special majority requirement.
This indicates a very serious inconsistency with 
democratic principles and outcomes, captured by the 
estimated “democratic shortfall” of 62.7 per cent.
7.  Increased basic votes
The proposal is that the basic vote should be 
increased beyond the doubling to which the Fund is 
currently committed. Three options are considered:
(a)  an increase to 11.3 per cent of the total vote (i.e. 
a return to the original 1944 ratio between basic 
votes and quotas);
(b)  an increase to 25 per cent of the total vote, as 
an intermediate option; and
(c)  an increase to 50 per cent of the total vote (i.e. 
parity between basic votes and quotas).
The effect of increasing the share of basic 
votes is broadly to increase the votes of countries 
with below-average quotas, and to reduce those of 
countries with above-average quotas, with the great-
est effect on those with the smallest quotas. This has 
the effect of: 
reducing the voting share of developed coun- • 
tries as a whole, and of all developed country 
groupings;
increasing the voting shares of developed coun- • 
tries as a whole, and all of all developing country 
groupings except for OPEC; and
narrowing considerably the gap between the  • 
countries with the smallest and the largest 
votes.
The indicators for this option are summarized 
in table 7.1. The effects of other levels of basic votes 
can broadly be interpolated or extrapolated from 
these results.
7.1  Congruence with democratic principles
Increasing the basic vote represents a move-
ment towards democratic principles (in the form 
of the Westphalian principle), but stops well short 
of achieving a democratic outcome. The relation-
ship with population is confined to the (relatively 
limited) statistical relationship between quotas and 
population. 
The shift towards congruence with democratic 
principles is relatively small. Applying the correla-
tion coefficient between post-Singapore quotas and 
population (0.346) to the share of the quota-based 
vote indicates a reduction in the “democratic short-
fall” from 62.7 per cent in the baseline scenario only 
to 58.0 per cent at 11.3 per cent, and 49.0 per cent at 
25 per cent. Only when the basic vote is increased 
to 50 per cent does the democratic shortfall fall sub-
stantially (to 32.7 per cent).14 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
7.2  Adequate representation for all 
individual countries 
Because of its disproportionate effect on coun-
tries with the smallest quotas, increasing the basic 
vote is an excellent option from this perspective. The 
share of the country with the smallest quota – Palau 
– in the total triples from 0.02 per cent to 0.06 per 
cent even in the 11.3 per cent scenario, increasing 
further to 0.14 per cent in the 25 per cent scenario, and 
0.27 per cent in the 50 per cent scenario. However, 
as the basic vote is increased, so the absolute effect 
of increasing quotas at the lower end of the scale is 
reduced, so that the relative increase is reduced still 
more sharply. Thus the vote at the 80th percentile is 
only 0.02 per cent higher than the smallest vote with 
Table 7.1








Democratic Explicit democratic  link (%) 4.2 11.3 25 50
principles “Democratic shortfall” 62.7 58 49 32.7
Individual country Smallest vote (%) 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.27
representation 90th percentile vote (%) 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.27
80th percentile vote (%) 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.28
Non-dominance G7 vote (%) 43.7 40.7 35 24.6 11.3 3.8
EU vote (%) 31.7 30.4 28 23.6 7.7 14.7
OECD vote (%) 63.2 59.7 53 40.7 18.3 16.3
Countries for 15% +1 1 1 2 3
Countries for 50% +1 9 11 15 34
Proportionality Inter-quartile range 7.8 4.7 2.8 1.6
IQR relative to population 1.2 0.73 0.43 0.26
Debtor/creditor High-income country vote (%) 65.3 62 55.7 44.2 15.4 21.2
balance HIC/LMIC per country (ratio) 7.0 6.1 4.7 2.9
HIC/LMIC relative to population 10.3 9 6.9 4.4
Country group HIPC vote (%) 3.1 4.5 7.1 12 8.7 21.7
representation Other PRGF vote (%) 5.7 6.8 8.9 12.8 29.6 20.7
Other dev’ing countries vote (%) 26.0 26.8 28.3 31 46.3 36.4
Transition economies vote (%) 7.7 8.2 9.2 11 6.3 14.7
Symmetrical Single-country constituencies 6 5 5 1
constituencies Constituency-dominant countries 7 8 6 5
Maximum countries for average 
constituency
84 55 30 16
Developing Number of countries 20 20 20
country losers % of population 57.9 57.9 57.9
% of total votes 25 25 25
Political feasibility Total losers 37 37 37
% of total votes 81.4 81.4 81.4
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the basic vote at 11.3 per cent or 25 per cent, and 
only 0.01 per cent higher at 50 per cent. Nonethe-
less, while this represents a marked reduction in the 
variation in votes among countries with the smallest 
quotas, it represents a substantial increase in votes 
in all cases.
7.3  Avoidance of domination by one  
(or a few) country(s)
By redistributing votes from countries with the 
largest quotas to those with the smallest, increasing 
the basic vote also reduces the dominance of the 
countries with the largest quotas. The largest single-
country share in the vote – that of the United States 
– falls from 16.5 per cent in the baseline to 15.3 per 
cent in the 11.3 per cent scenario, 13.0 per cent in 
the 25 per cent scenario, and 8.8 per cent in the 50 
per cent scenario. This implies that the United States 
would retain its veto on votes requiring an 85 per 
cent majority unless the basic vote were increased 
beyond its original level. While the number of coun-
tries required for an overall majority of the votes is 
increased only slightly in the 11.3 per cent scenario, 
from nine to 11, and to 15 in the 25 per cent scenario, 
it increases much more, to 34 with the basic vote at 
50 per cent.
The reduction in the voting shares of the major 
developed country groupings also becomes signifi-
cant only when the basic vote reaches 50 per cent. 
The G7’s vote is most affected, because of their 
very large quotas per member. While this falls only 
from 43.7 per cent to 40.7 per cent with the basic 
vote at 11.3 per cent, it falls more significantly to 
35.0 per cent with the basic vote at 25 per cent, and 
to 24.6 per cent at 50 per cent. The total vote of the 
27 EU members would decline from 31.7 per cent in 
the baseline scenario to 30.4 per cent, 28.0 per cent 
and 23.6 per cent in the three scenarios. That of the 
OECD would fall only from 63.2 per cent to 59.7 per 
cent with the basic vote at 11.3 per cent, and 53 per 
cent in the 25 per cent scenario. Only with a basic 
vote of 50 per cent would the effect of quotas be 
diluted sufficiently for the OECD to lose its overall 
majority of the votes, reducing their total voting share 
to 40.7 per cent.
Similarly, the dominance of the developed 
countries as a whole is diluted, but to a relatively 
limited extent. The developed countries as a whole 
would maintain their overall majority of the vote 
(though reduced from 60.4 per cent to 50.6 per cent) 
even if the basic vote were increased to 25 per cent; 
and their total vote would remain at 38.8 per cent 
even if the basic vote were increased to 50 per cent 
of the total.
7.4  Proportionality of difference between 
countries
A major effect of increasing the basic vote is 
to reduce differences in votes between countries. 
This effect is substantial even at 11.3 per cent, the 
inter-quartile range of votes being reduced from 7.8 
in the baseline scenario to 4.7. It is compressed sub-
stantially further, to 2.8, at 25 per cent, and to just 
1.6 at 50 per cent. The last figure is almost certainly 
untenable politically and this may also be true of the 
25 per cent level.
The extent of this reduction can be further 
demonstrated by the illustrative country examples 
shown in table 7.2. The narrowing within income 
bands is very pronounced in the 50 per cent scenario. 
For example, the ratio between India’s vote and that 
of the Solomon Islands is reduced from 69 in the 
post-Singapore scenario to 27 with the basic vote at 
11.3 per cent, 11 at 25 per cent, and 4.5 at 50 per cent. 
The ratio between China’s vote and Cape Verde’s 
is similarly reduced from 137 in the baseline to 7.8 
with the basic vote at 50 per cent; and that between 
the United States and Luxembourg from 649 to 26. 
(It should be noted that the narrowing of the gap 
becomes more limited as per capita income rises, 
reflecting increasing quotas, and the consequent re-
duction in the share of the basic vote in the country’s 
total vote.)
While the ideal ratio is a matter of subjective 
judgement, the ratio between the respective popula-
tions of these pairs of countries (between 650 and 
2,500) would seem to suggest that the 25 per cent 
and 50 per cent scenarios, at least, may narrow the 
gap between the largest and smallest votes among 
developing countries at similar income levels further 
than is justified in terms of proportionality.
While increasing the basic vote also narrows 
the gap between higher- and lower-income countries 
with similar population levels, this effect is more 
limited. (Again, larger quotas in absolute terms 
mean the effect is in principle most limited in larger 
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vote and that of Indonesia is reduced only from 17 
to 12 even in the 50 per cent scenario; that between 
the votes of Germany and Ethiopia from 71 to 11; 
that between Belgium and Chad from 44 to 4.7; and 
that between Luxembourg and the Solomon Islands 
from 5.4 to 1.2.
7.5  Appropriate balance between “creditor” 
and “borrowing” countries
The vote of the high-income countries is reduced 
relatively little in the 11.3 per cent and 25 per cent 
scenarios, from 65.3 per cent in baseline to 62.0 per 
cent and 55.7 per cent respectively. Only in the 50 per 
cent scenario does it fall below an overall majority, to 
44.2 per cent. Interpolation suggests that an increase 
in the basic vote to around 37–38 per cent of total 
votes would be required to attain parity between high-
income and low-/middle-income countries.
This means that the high-income countries re-
main substantially over-represented relative to their 
shares of membership and of population. Their votes 
per member are 6.1 times those of low- and middle-
income countries at 11.3 per cent, 4.7 times at 25 per 
cent, and 2.9 times even at 50 per cent (reduced from 
7.0 in the baseline scenario). Relative to population, 
their over-representation is reduced from 10.3 in the 
baseline to 9.0, 6.9 and 4.4 in the three scenarios.
7.6  Adequacy of representation for all 
country groups 
As noted above, the voting shares of all devel-
oping country groupings except the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are 
increased in all three scenarios. These increases are 
also broadly proportional to the extent of their current 
under-representation, with the arguable exception 
of countries with a population of less than 1 mil-
lion, whose votes are increased disproportionately. 
However, even in the 50 per cent scenario, repre-
sentation of the 40 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC-eligible countries) (12.0 per cent) and of the 
38 non-HIPC Poverty Redaction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) countries (12.8 per cent), though quadrupled 
and nearly doubled respectively, remains well below 
the 15 per cent threshold, as does that of the transition 
economies, at 11.0 per cent. Extrapolation indicates 
that an increase in the basic vote to around 65 per cent 
of the total would be required for HIPCs and other 
PRGF countries to attain the 15 per cent threshold. 
(Since transition economies represent only 14.7 per 
cent of the membership, even a 100 per cent basic 
vote would not give them 15 per cent of the vote.)
It should be noted, however, that the 12.0 per 
cent of votes attained by the HIPC countries in the 
50 per cent scenario, though less than their share of 
membership (21.7 per cent) is substantially greater 
than their share in population (8.7 per cent). The same 
applies to the transition economies. Other PRGF 
countries remain substantially under-represented 
relative to population, largely as a result of India’s 
presence in the group.
The total vote of low- and middle-income 
countries not eligible for the PRGF increases from 
30.7 per cent in the baseline scenario to 36.3 per cent 
with basic votes at 50 per cent. This is in line with 
their share of membership (36.4 per cent) but less 
than their share of population (46.3 per cent), largely 
reflecting China’s presence.
7.7  Symmetry of constituencies 
By increasing the votes of the countries with 
the smallest votes, increasing the basic vote helps 
to make the constituency system less asymmetrical. 
However, this effect is relatively limited at the top 
end of the distribution. Using the approach outlined 
above, the 11.3 per cent option would reduce the 
number of single-country constituencies only from 
six in the baseline scenario to five, while increasing 
the number of dominant countries from seven to eight. 
The 25 per cent option would reduce the number of 
dominant countries to six, while leaving the number 
of single-country constituencies at five. Only in the 
50 per cent case would the number of single-country 
constituencies be reduced substantially (to one); and 
five dominant countries would remain.
At the other end of the scale, however, the ef-
fect would be dramatic. The maximum number of 
countries required to form an average-sized constitu-
ency is reduced from 84 in the baseline scenario to 
55 at 11.3 per cent, 30 at 25 per cent and just 16 at 
50 per cent.18 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
7.8  Broad acceptability to developing countries
As noted above, all three scenarios for increased 
basic votes result in increased votes for all develop-
ing country groupings considered here, with the 
exception of OPEC (largely as a result of their high 
quotas). However, the same is not true of all indi-
vidual developing countries, as those with relatively 
high quotas are also adversely affected. As shown 
in table 7.3 there are 20 countries in this category. 
These include, notably, eight OPEC countries, three 
of them high-income, one other high-income country 
(the Republic of Korea), and a number of the largest 
middle-income and better-off low-income countries. 
To summarize geographically, the losers include
in  •  Asia: China, India, Indonesia, the Republic 
of Korea and Malaysia;
in  •  Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;
in  •  sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria and South 
Africa;
in  •  Europe: Poland, the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, Turkey; and
in the  •  Middle East: Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran 
(Islamic Republic of), Iraq and Kuwait.
This means that the overwhelming majority of 
developing countries, and particularly of low- and 
middle-income countries, gain from increasing basic 
votes, which in principle provides substantial scope 
for a developing country coalition. However, while 
fewer in number than for most other options, the los-
ers include a disproportionate number of countries of 
particular importance to a politically effective devel-
oping country coalition. This represents a significant 
obstacle to the adoption of this option as the basis 
for a common developing country position. Since the 
countries with the largest quotas are worst affected, 
the losers also account for a large proportion both 
of votes (25 per cent of the total) and of population 
(57.9 per cent).
7.9  Other political considerations
A key advantage of the basic votes approach 
is that it is already on the agenda. Not only are the 
principle of, and mechanisms for, basic votes already 
in place, but the Fund is already committed to “at least 
doubling” the share of basic votes in the total. This 
means that the size of basic votes is automatically 
part of the negotiation. There are no technical or legal 
problems, and no data requirements involved. There 
is also arguably a precedent for increasing basic votes 
to 11.3 per cent of the total (as the level established 
at the Fund’s foundation), though not beyond.
However, is an important political obstacle is 
that this option has a systematically negative effect 
on precisely those countries with the greatest say in 
the Quota Review – those with the largest quotas. In 
total, only 37 countries will lose from an increased 
basic vote, one-fifth of the total membership; but they 
account for more than four-fifths (81.4 per cent) of the 
vote – more than any other option considered here.
Table 7.3





Algeria  -0.003 -0.007 -0.016
Argentina  -0.031 -0.091 -0.199
Brazil  -0.062 -0.179 -0.393
China  -0.230 -0.667 -1.464
India  -0.099 -0.288 -0.631
Indonesia  -0.030 -0.087 -0.191
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) -0.011 -0.031 -0.067
Iraq  -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
Kuwait  -0.007 -0.020 -0.043
Malaysia  -0.010 -0.030 -0.065
Mexico  -0.066 -0.190 -0.418
Nigeria  -0.019 -0.055 -0.122
Poland  -0.006 -0.018 -0.040
Republic of Korea  -0.058 -0.169 -0.370
Russian Federation  -0.159 -0.460 -1.009
Saudi Arabia  -0.194 -0.560 -1.230
South Africa  -0.023 -0.067 -0.146
Turkey  -0.000 -0.001 -0.003
Ukraine  -0.006 -0.019 -0.041
Venezuela  
(Bolivarian Rep. of) -0.049 -0.143 -0.313
   Total countries 20 20 2019 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
While the principle of increasing the basic vote 
has been conceded, it has taken more than 20 years 
to get to this point; and the commitment to at least 
doubling the share of votes is likely to be presented 
as a major concession in itself. A few developed 
countries may go as far as supporting a move to 11.3 
per cent, but they will be a small minority, and seem 
unlikely to press the case very hard. Importantly, it 
is only when the basic vote reaches 25 per cent or 
even 50 per cent that there are substantial benefits to 
developing countries.
7.10 Overall assessment
Increasing the basic vote offers significant 
benefits to developing countries, and especially to 
those with the smallest votes. However, the effects on 
developing countries as a whole, on the concentration 
of power, and on the symmetry of the constituency 
system become significant only at a basic vote of 
25 per cent, and substantial only at 50 per cent. At 
this level of the vote, however, the dispersion of 
the vote becomes extremely compressed, and very 
asymmetrical between the top and the bottom of the 
quota scale. Politically, there is some impetus behind 
increasing the basic vote; but, by itself, it would re-
sult in reduced votes for a number of very important 
developing countries.
Increasing the basic vote therefore cannot be 
considered to provide a complete solution to the 
problem of IMF voting reform. Nonetheless, the 
fact that it is on the agenda, and that there are few 
objective (rather than self-interested) arguments that 
developed countries can adduce against it, makes it 
worth considering for inclusion as part of a broader 
package of demands. Since it can readily be combined 
with other changes, for example in quota formulae, 
its inclusion in such a package would not cause any 
loss of coherence.
8.   Alternative quota formulae I: the 
Cooper and EU proposals 
The Cooper and EU options are those preferred 
respectively by the United States and the European 
Union. 
The Cooper option is the proposal put forward  • 
by the Quota Formula Review Group (QFRG), 
created in 1999, and chaired by Professor 
Richard Cooper of Harvard. It recommends a 
quota using only GDP and absolute variability 
of receipts, in a ratio of 2:1.
The EU option is based on gross domestic prod- • 
uct (GDP) and openness, also in a ratio of 2:1.
Both these options imply an increase in the 
United States quota. However, the United States is on 
the record as having agreed not to increase its share 
in the total votes in the Fund from its pre-Singapore 
level. Each option is therefore also considered with 
the application of such a ceiling.
The results of the assessment of these options 
are summarized in table 8.1.
8.1  Congruence with democratic principles
Like the status quo, the explicitly democratic 
component of alternative quota-based approaches 
is limited to the basic vote, assumed here (for ease 
of comparison) to be 4.2 per cent, as in the baseline. 
In addition, quotas based on both the Cooper and 
the EU approaches are more weakly correlated with 
population than post-Singapore quotas, increasing 
their “democratic shortfalls” to 67.7 per cent and 
66.1 per cent respectively, compared with 62.7 per 
cent for the baseline. A ceiling on the United States 
quota share reduces these figures to 62.9 per cent and 
62.0 per cent, respectively just above and just below 
the baseline. Thus, the EU and Cooper approaches 
represent a further step away from democratic prin-
ciples, and no significant improvement even with a 
United States quota ceiling.
8.2  Adequate representation for all 
individual countries 
The smallest vote under both approaches is vir-
tually identical to the baseline scenario, at 0.022 per 
cent, though increasing fractionally to 0.025 per cent 
with a United States quota ceiling. However, the gra-
dient in the bottom quintile of votes is substantially 
flatter than in the baseline, the vote remaining at only 
0.03 per cent in both cases even at the 80th percentile 
(and even with a United States quota ceiling), com-
pared with 0.05 per cent in the baseline scenario. 
Again, this represents a significant deterioration from 
the status quo.20 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
8.3  Avoidance of domination by one  
(or a few) country(s)
Both alternative quota formulae result in a sub-
stantial further increase in the total vote of the G7, 
to give them a substantial overall majority (55.4 per 
cent in the Cooper formula and 57.3 per cent in the 
EU formula, compared with 43.7 per cent in the base-
line). They also increase the total vote of members 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) to more than three-quarters of 
the total (75.1 per cent and 77.5 per cent respectively, 
as compared with 63.2 per cent). All these figures 
remain considerably above baseline levels even with 
a United States ceiling. 
Table 8.1










Democratic Explicit democratic  link (%) 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
principles “Democratic shortfall” 62.7 67.7 66.1 62.9 62
Individual country Smallest vote (%) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
representation 90th percentile vote (%) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
80th percentile vote (%) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Non-dominance G7 vote (%) 43.7 55.4 57.3 50.1 53.1 11.3 3.8
EU vote (%) 31.7 29.8 34 33.4 37.3 7.7 14.7
OECD vote (%) 63.2 75.1 77.5 72.2 75.3 18.3 16.3
Countries for 15% +1 1 1 1 1 1
Countries for 50% +1 9 5 5 7 6
Proportionality Inter-quartile range 7.8 8.6 7.8 8.6 7.8
IQR relative to population 1.2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Debtor/creditor High-income country vote (%) 65.3 74 76.3 70.9 74.0 15.4 21.2
balance HIC/LMIC per country (ratio) 7.0 10.6 12.0 9.1 10.6
HIC/LMIC relative to 
population 10.3 15.7 17.7 13.4 15.6
Country group HIPC vote (%) 3.1 1.8 1.4 2 1.5 8.7 21.7
representation Other PRGF vote (%) 5.7 3.6 3.3 4 3.6 29.6 20.7
Other dev’ing countries vote (%) 26.0 20.6 19 23.1 20.9 46.3 36.4
Transition economies vote (%) 7.7 4.9 4.4 5.5 4.8 6.3 14.7
Symmetrical Single-country constituencies 6 7 9 6 9
constituencies Constituency-dominant countries 7 10 8 9 8
Maximum countries for average 
constituency 84 103 109 98 104
Developing Number of countries 135 146 116 130
country losers % of population 54.6 58.6 54.1 58.2
% of total votes 30.9 33.2 29.4 32.2
Political feasibility Total losers 147 158 128 138
% of total votes 53.1 51.2 51.6 40.7
% of population 58.3 61.3 57.7 59.221 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
The formulae differ, however, in their effects 
on the EU vote (in the absence of a United States 
ceiling). While the Cooper formula reduces the EU 
vote from 31.7 per cent to 29.8 per cent, the EU pro-
posal unsurprisingly increases it to 34.0 per cent. A 
ceiling on the United States quota share reverses the 
reduction under the Cooper formula (resulting in an 
increase to 33.4 per cent) and accentuates the increase 
using the EU formula (to 37.3 per cent).
Both options result in the United States retaining 
more than 15 per cent of the vote; and both almost 
halve the number of countries required for an overall 
majority to five (from nine in the baseline scenario). 
While this effect is moderated by a United States 
quota ceiling, the number of countries required re-
mains substantially lower than in the baseline at six 
(EU) or seven (Cooper).
8.4  Proportionality of difference between 
countries
The inter-quartile range of votes remains 
unchanged from the baseline level (7.8) in the EU 
formula, and is increased slightly to 8.6 in the Cooper 
formula. Coincidentally, the inter-quartile range rela-
tive to population is 0.88 in both cases, a reduction 
from 1.21 in the baseline (although the significance 
of this indicator for quota-based approaches is lim-
ited).
8.5  Appropriate balance between “creditor” 
and “borrowing” countries
Both the absolute and relative advantage of 
“creditor” countries is substantially increased by both 
formulae, with or without a United States quota ceil-
ing. The high-income countries’ share of the vote is 
increased further, from 65.3 per cent in the baseline 
to 74,0 per cent (70.9 per cent with a United States 
ceiling) in the Cooper approach, and still further to 
76.3 per cent (74.0 per cent with a United States 
ceiling) in the EU approach.
High-income countries’ average vote per country 
relative to low-/middle-income countries is increased 
from 7.0 to 10.6 under Cooper, and 12.0 under the 
EU option (9.1 and 10.6 with a United States ceiling). 
Their over-representation relative to population is 
increased from a factor of 10.3 to 15.7 (Cooper) and 
17.7 (EU), again only slightly moderated by a United 
States quota ceiling (to 13.4 and 15.6 respectively).
8.6  Adequacy of representation for all 
country groups
Representation of all developing country groups 
is reduced substantially from the baseline levels in 
both options, with or without a United States quota 
ceiling, and is consequently substantially further 
below their respective shares of both population 
and membership. For HIPCs, the reduction is from 
3.1 per cent to between 1.4 per cent and 2.0 per 
cent; for other PRGF countries from 5.7 per cent to 
between 3.3 per cent and 4.0 per cent; for transition 
economies, from 7.7 per cent to between 4.4 per cent 
and 5.5 per cent; and for non-PRGF countries from 
26.0 per cent to between 19.0 per cent and 23.1 per 
cent. In all instances, the reduction is greater under 
the EU formula, and less with a United States quota 
ceiling than without it, and pushes the country groups’ 
votes still further below their respective shares in 
membership and population.
8.7  Symmetry of constituencies
Reflecting the increased polarisation between 
developed and developing countries, the asym-
metry of the constituency system is also increased 
somewhat from the baseline level. The number of 
single-country constituencies is increased from six 
to seven in the Cooper formula and nine in the EU 
formula, and the number of constituency-dominant 
countries is increased from seven to ten and eight 
respectively. While this is unaffected by a United 
States quota ceiling in the EU case, both figures are 
reduced by one in the Cooper case.
At the other end of the scale, the shallower 
gradient of votes at the lower end of the distribution 
also results in substantial increases in the maximum 
number of countries required to form an average-
sized constituency, from 84 in the baseline to 103 for 
Cooper (98 with a United States ceiling) and 109 for 
the EU (104 with a ceiling). In all cases, this repre-
sents a significant majority (between 53 per cent and 
59 per cent) of the total membership.22 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
8.8  Broad acceptability to developing 
countries
Almost all developing countries – between 135 
and 146 in total – lose votes using either the Cooper or 
the EU formula. This is reduced only to 116–130 even 
with a United States quota ceiling. The developing 
countries adversely affected represent a significant 
majority (54–59 per cent) of the world population. 
Despite the current under-representation of most 
developing countries, they also have sufficient votes 
(29–33 per cent, in the various scenarios) to block 
either of these options, provided they can develop 
and maintain a united position. 
8.9  Other political considerations
In principle, these options have a head start 
politically, in that they are backed by the United 
States and the EU respectively. The Cooper formula 
also has some advantage in originating with an os-
tensibly neutral body. (The EU option, conversely, 
loses credibility through being rather too obviously 
self-serving.)
However, both options lose considerable cred-
ibility by compounding the most conspicuously 
undemocratic features of the current system, and by 
imposing losses on a large majority of the member-
ship, including a significant number of developed 
countries as well as almost the entire developing 
world. As a result, the only scenario which does not 
have an adverse effect on countries with a majority 
of the current vote is the EU formula with a United 
States voting ceiling, which reduces the votes of 138 
countries casting 40.7 per cent of the votes. Nonethe-
less, the strong skewing of the benefits towards those 
countries which are already most over-represented 
means that this is the smallest voting share for losing 
countries of any of the options considered here.
8.10 Overall Assessment
The Cooper and EU formulae actually com-
pound almost all of the problems of the status quo, 
by increasing the over-representation of (most) 
developed countries at the expense of (almost all) 
developing countries, increasing the imbalance be-
tween creditor countries and borrowing countries, 
the concentration of power and the asymmetry of 
the constituency system. Clearly, they do not provide 
a basis for a common developing country position. 
Equally clearly, it is important that developing 
countries unite behind a common position of strong 
opposition to both of these formulae.
Beyond this, almost all developing countries 
have a strong shared interest in ensuring that neither 
of these formulae is used as the starting point for 
discussion, and especially that the discussion does 
not degenerate into a debate between these two op-
tions. The result of negotiations on this basis would 
be to lower still further the starting point for devel-
oping countries, who would find themselves having 
to make concessions even to retain the very limited 
votes they have at present. This scenario should be 
avoided at all costs.
9.   Alternative quota formulae II:  
the Buira proposal 
Former Director of G-24, Ariel Buira has pro-
posed another alternative quota formula, based on 
GDP at purchasing power parity and volatility, in a 
ratio of 4:1. As one might expect, in contrast with 
the Cooper and EU formulae, this has the effect of 
strengthening rather than weakening the position of 
developing countries.
The results of the assessment of this option are 
summarized in table 9.1.
9.1  Congruence with democratic principles
As with other quota-based proposals, this paper 
assumes the maintenance of a basic vote equivalent 
to 4.2 per cent of the total, which is therefore the 
explicitly democratic component of this option. 
Unlike the Cooper and EU proposals, however, the 
Buira quotas are much more closely correlated with 
population than the post-Singapore distribution. This 
almost halves the “democratic shortfall” compared 
with the baseline, from 65.3 per cent to 34.1 per cent. 
This is lower than any other option considered here 
which includes the use of quotas, with the excep-
tion of an increase in the basic vote to 50 per cent 
(32.6 per cent). 23 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
It should also be noted that the shortfall could 
be reduced further by combining the use of the 
Buira quota formula with an increased basic vote – 
for example to 26.7 per cent with the basic vote at 
25 per cent or 17.8 per cent at 50 per cent- and/or 
the addition of a second basic vote proportional to 
population.
9.2  Adequate representation for all 
individual countries
The smallest vote in the Buira proposal is 
approximately three times that in the baseline, at 
0.06 per cent compared with 0.02 per cent. Those at 
the 90th and 80th percentiles are increased by a larger 
Table 9.1





Democratic Explicit democratic  link (%) 4.2 4.2
principles “Democratic shortfall” 62.7 34.1
Individual country Smallest vote (%) 0.02 0.06
representation 90th percentile vote (%) 0.03 0.09
80th percentile vote (%) 0.05 0.11
Non-dominance G7 vote (%) 43.7 33.6 11.3 3.8
EU vote (%) 31.7 19.7 7.7 14.7
OECD vote (%) 63.2 46.8 18.3 16.3
Countries for 15% +1 1 1
Countries for 50% +1 9 10
Proportionality Inter-quartile range 7.8 3.2
IQR relative to population 1.2 19.34
Debtor/creditor High-income country vote (%) 65.3 46.4 15.4 21.2
balance HIC/LMIC per country (ratio) 7.0 3.2
HIC/LMIC relative to population 10.3 4.8
Country group HIPC vote (%) 3.1 7.7 8.7 21.7
representation Other PRGF vote (%) 5.7 11.8 29.6 20.7
Other dev’ing countries vote (%) 26.0 34.1 46.3 36.4
Transition economies vote (%) 7.7 7.8 6.3 14.7
Symmetrical Single-country constituencies 6 5
constituencies Constituency-dominant countries 7 5
Maximum countries for average 
constituency
84 44
Developing Number of countries 34
country losers % of population 13.4
% of total votes 18.6
Political feasibility Total losers 52
% of total votes 74.5
% of population 26.324 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
absolute margin (0.06 per cent in both cases), but in 
the latter case a smaller relative margin (being dou-
bled rather than tripled). This indicates a substantial 
increase in representation for those countries with 
the smallest share of the votes.
9.3  Avoidance of domination by one  
(or a few) country(s)
While the votes of developed country group-
ings remain far above their respective shares in the 
membership and population, they are reduced by 
between about a quarter and a third from their base-
line levels. That of the G7 falls from 43.7 per cent 
to 33.6 per cent, that of the EU from 31.7 per cent 
to 19.7 per cent and that of the OECD from 63.2 per 
cent to 46.8 per cent. However, the United States 
maintains its vote of more than 15 per cent; and the 
minimum number of countries required for an overall 
majority increases only from nine to ten, indicating 
only a modest reduction in the overall concentration 
of voting power.
9.4  Proportionality of difference between 
countries
The inter-quartile range of votes under the Buira 
approach is much lower than any other quota-based 
option (other than increasing the basic vote), at 3.2, 
compared with 7.8 in the baseline scenario (and 
7.8–8.6 in the Cooper and EU proposals), indicat-
ing a marked reduction in the dispersion of votes. 
However, it remains higher than with a basic vote 
of 25 per cent or more, or in any population-based 
approach other than direct proportionality.
9.5  Appropriate balance between “creditor” 
and “borrowing” countries
The Buira proposal reduces the total vote of the 
high-income countries below half of the total, from 
65.3 per cent in the baseline scenario to 46.4 per cent. 
However, this remains more than double these coun-
tries’ share in the IMF membership, and more than 
triple their share in population. As a result, relative to 
low-/middle-income countries, they are over-repre-
sented by a factor of 3.2 in terms of votes per country, 
and by a factor of 4.8 relative to population. Nonethe-
less, these figures represent a reduction of more than 
half from the post-Singapore distribution.
9.6  Adequacy of representation for all 
country groups 
Representation of all developing country groups 
is increased by the Buira proposal with the excep-
tion of the transition economies, whose total vote 
is increased only from 7.7 per cent to 7.8 per cent. 
The HIPC countries benefit most, with an increase 
in vote from 3.1 per cent to 7.7 per cent, while the 
vote of other PRGF countries is more than doubled 
from 5.7 per cent to 11.8 per cent. The total vote of 
non-PRGF countries is also increased from 26.0 per 
cent to 34.1 per cent. However, the votes of all three 
groups remain below their respective shares of mem-
bership and of population. The vote of the transition 
economies, at 7.7 per cent, is somewhat above their 
share of population (6.3 per cent), but well below 
their share of membership (14.7 per cent).
9.7  Symmetry of constituencies
By substantially increasing the smallest votes, 
the Buira proposal almost halves the maximum 
number of countries required for an average-sized 
constituency, from 84 in the baseline scenario to 44. 
However, the improvement in the symmetry of the 
constituency system at the top end of the scale is much 
more limited: the number of single-country constitu-
encies falls only from six to five, and the number of 
constituency-dominant countries from seven to five.
9.8  Broad acceptability to developing 
countries
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of the Buira 
proposal as a basis for common developing country 
position is that it reduces the votes of a substantial 
number (34) of individual developing countries (ta-
ble 9.2). These include a number of important players 
politically, including Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, the Russian Federation, South Africa and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It is noteworthy 
that there are also several other sub-Saharan African 
countries on the list, in contrast with the non-quota-
based options. Together, these countries account for 
13.4 per cent of (total) population, and 18.6 per cent 
of the total vote.
9.9  Other political considerations
Like any proposal which reduces the votes of 
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has adverse effects on countries accounting for the 
majority (in this instance 74.5 per cent) of the vote. 
These countries can therefore be expected to seek 
pretexts for opposing the proposal, or seeking to 
change it in their own favour. The Achilles heal of 
the Buira proposal in this context may be its use of 
GDP at purchasing power parity, which also largely 
drives its favourable effects. The problems associated 
with estimation the estimation of PPP exchange rates 
and limited data availability may well be used as an 
argument against this approach. If this option is to 
be pursued, it will be necessary to prepare a solid 
defence against such arguments.
9.10 Overall assessment
While the Buira proposal retains some of the 
problems of the quota system as a whole, unlike the 
Cooper and EU proposals, it represents a significant 
improvement in voting patterns in most respects. The 
two potential stumbling blocks are, on a practical 
level, the problems of developing a complete, reliable 
and accurate data set for purchasing power parity 
exchange rates; and, on a political level, its negative 
effects on a number of major developing countries.
If it appears possible to overcome the former 
problem, further consideration should be given to 
options for overcoming the latter, while also, ideally, 
strengthening its overall positive effect on developing 
countries as a whole. Such options might include, for 
example, combining a switch to Buira quotas with 
an increase in the basic vote, or adding a population-
related component, either as part of the quota, or as a 
separate component of the vote. (see section14.5.)
10.  Democratic principles I: 
population-weighting
“One-person-one vote” is perhaps the most fun-
damental principle of democratic decision-making. 
Making votes directly proportional to population is 
therefore an obvious option for IMF voting reform. 
In practice, however, as discussed below, the extreme 
range from the population of the smallest IMF mem-
ber (Palau, with 20,000 people) to the largest (China, 
with 1.3bn) makes this option problematic in several 
respects in the present context. 
There are two possible ways of dealing with 
this problem within a strictly democratic paradigm: 
to use a declining non-linear function of popula-
tion; or to combine a component of the vote directly 
Table 9.2
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Russian Federation  -0.67
Saudi Arabia  -2.60
Senegal  -0.01
Slovenia  -0.01
South Africa  -0.08
Sri Lanka  -0.03
Syrian Arab Republic -0.02
Trinidad and Tobago  -0.05
Ukraine  -0.15
United Arab Emirates  -0.06
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) -0.89
Zambia  -0.08
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proportional to population with a component based 
on the Westphalian principle of “one-country-one 
vote”. This section considers two non-linear func-
tions of population – the square root and the cube 
root – while the following section considers combi-
nations of proportional and Westphalian votes with 
alternative weights.
The results of the assessment of these options 
are summarized in table 10.1.
10.1 Congruence with democratic principles
The basis of these options exclusively on 
population means that they are explicitly (if uncon-
ventionally, in the case of the square- and cube-root 
approaches) founded on economic principles. Using 
the “democratic shortfall” method outlined above, for 
consistency of comparison, the proportional option 
by definition has a zero shortfall, while the non-linear 
nature of the square and cube root options give rise to 
measured shortfalls of 11.2 per cent and 23.6 per cent 
respectively. These are, unsurprisingly, lower than for 
any quota-based option considered here.
10.2 Adequate representation for all 
individual countries
The proportional option by definition gives very 
small countries very small votes. Due to the extreme 
disparities in population size between countries, the 
smallest vote (for Palau) is just 0.0003 per cent, little 
more than one-hundredth of that in the baseline sce-
nario, while those at the 90th and 80th percentiles are 
respectively 0.005 per cent (for Iceland) and 0.02 per 
cent (for the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste). 
This means that around one-fifth of the membership 
has a vote smaller than the smallest in the baseline 
scenario, and one-tenth less than a quarter of the 
smallest baseline vote.
In the square-root option, the smallest vote is 
marginally smaller than in the baseline scenario, at 
0.020 per cent (as compared with 0.023 per cent), 
but increases more quickly as one moves up from the 
bottom of the scale, to 0.08 per cent (compared with 
0.03 per cent) at the 90th percentile and 0.14 per cent 
(compared with 0.05 per cent) at the 80th. It is only 
the smallest vote (that of Palau in both cases) which 
is larger in the baseline scenario.
In the cube-root option, the smallest vote is 
substantially greater at 0.07 per cent, and votes again 
increase more quickly above the bottom of the scale, 
to 0.16 per cent at the 90th percentile and 0.24 per 
cent at the 80th. 
This suggests that the square-root, and espe-
cially the cube-root, option gives significantly greater 
representation to countries with small votes than in 
the status quo, except for the smallest vote using the 
square root.
10.3 Avoidance of domination by one  
(or a few) country(s)
Once again, the proportional option performs 
very poorly by this criterion, due to the extreme 
disparities in population size between countries. 
Uniquely among the options considered here, this 
option gives each of two countries (China and India) 
more than 15 per cent of the votes. It also requires 
only six countries’ votes to form an absolute majority, 
compared with nine in the baseline.
Again, the square-root option performs better, 
and the cube-root option better still. It requires at least 
five countries’ votes to reach 15 per cent of the total 
in the square root option, and ten in the cube-root 
option; and the numbers of countries required for an 
overall majority are 34 and 50 respectively.
Dominance by developed country groupings 
disappears in all three options, the total vote of the 
G7 being between 7.6 per cent and 11.3 per cent, that 
of the EU between 7.7 per cent and 14.6 per cent, and 
even that of the OECD between 18.3 per cent and 
20.6 per cent. In the proportional option, however, 
domination by developed country groupings is re-
placed by domination by China and India with votes 
of 20.5 per cent and 17.2 per cent respectively.
10.4 Proportionality of difference between 
countries
The inter-quartile range of votes is exceptionally 
wide in the proportional option at 12.3 (the highest of 
any of the options considered here), once again due to 
the wide disparity in country populations. By defini-
tion, this range is directly proportional to population. 27 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
This figure is narrowed considerably in the square-
root option, to 3.7 (0.27 relative to population), and 
further in the cube-root option, to 2.4 (0.17 relative 
to population). As in the case of a 25 per cent basic 
vote, where the figure is 2.8, this degree of narrowing 
of differentials between country votes may render the 
cube-root option politically unviable.
10.5 Appropriate balance between “creditor” 
and “borrowing” countries
All of these options shift the balance of rep-
resentation strongly from “creditor” countries to 
“borrowing” countries. The share of high-income 
countries in the total vote is reduced to 20.5 per cent 
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Democratic principles Explicit democratic  link (%) 4.2 100 100 100
“Democratic shortfall” 62.7 0 11.2 23.6
Individual country Smallest vote (%) 0.02 0.0003 0.02 0.07
representation 90th percentile vote (%) 0.03 0.005 0.08 0.16
80th percentile vote (%) 0.05 0.02 0.14 0.24
Non-dominance G7 vote (%) 43.7 11.3 9.4 7.6 11.3 3.8
EU vote (%) 31.7 7.7 13.5 14.6 7.7 14.7
OECD vote (%) 63.2 18.3 21.6 20.6 18.3 16.3
Countries for 15% +1 1 1 (x2) 5 10
Countries for 50% +1 9 6 34 50
Proportionality Inter-quartile range 7.8 12.3 3.7 2.4
IQR relative to population 1.2 1 0.27 0.17
Debtor/creditor High-income country vote (%) 65.3 15.4 19.9 20.5 15.4 21.2
balance HIC/LMIC per country (ratio) 7.0 0.68 0.92 0.96
HIC/LMIC relative to population 10.3 1 1.37 1.42
Country group HIPC vote (%) 3.1 8.7 18.7 21 8.7 21.7
representation Other PRGF vote (%) 5.7 29.6 21.1 19.7 29.6 20.7
Other developing countries vote (%) 26.0 46.3 40.3 38.7 46.3 36.4
Transition economies vote (%) 7.7 6.3 12.1 13.7 6.3 14.7
Symmetrical Single-country constituencies 6 5 2 0
constituencies Constituency-dominant countries 7 6 2 2
Maximum countries for average 
constituency
84 97 46 30
Developing Number of countries 86 15 10
country losers % of population 10.6 5 26.7
% of total votes 21.9 12.2 15.8
Political feasibility Total losers 110 36 28
% of total votes 79.8 69.6 72.7
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in the cube-root option, 19.9 per cent in the square-
root option, and 15.4 per cent in the proportional 
option, in all cases between their shares in member-
ship and population. The proportional option gives 
equal representation to high- and low-/middle-income 
countries relative to population (by definition), but 
results in the former being significantly under-repre-
sented relative to membership (by 32 per cent). The 
non-linear options result in a much smaller degree of 
under-representation of high-income countries rela-
tive to membership (by 4–8 per cent) and significant 
over-representation (by 37–42 per cent) relative to 
population.
10.6 Adequacy of representation for all 
country groups
In the proportional option, both HIPCs and tran-
sition economies remain well below the 15 per cent 
threshold at 8.7 per cent and 6.3 per cent respectively. 
The votes of both are also less than half their respec-
tive shares in membership. Both the “other PRGF” 
and the non-PRGF groups, by contrast, remain above 
both the 15 per cent threshold and their membership 
shares, in the latter case reflecting the membership of 
India in the first group and of China in the second.
The non-linear options even out this pattern 
considerably, and with relatively little differentiation 
between the two. 
HIPCs have 19–21 per cent of the vote, well  • 
above their population share, but slightly below 
their share of membership;
transition economies have 12–14 per cent of  • 
the vote, below the 15 per cent threshold, but 
again between their share of population and of 
membership;
the “other PRGF” group have 20–21 per cent  • 
of the vote, broadly in line with their member-
ship share, but less than their population share 
(29.6 per cent); and
non-PRGF countries have 39–40 per cent of  • 
the vote, again between their membership and 
population shares.
10.7 Symmetry of constituencies
The polarisation of votes in the proportional 
option unsurprisingly gives rise to a markedly asym-
metrical pattern of constituencies. There are five 
single-country constituencies and six constituency 
dominant countries, slightly better than in the base-
line scenario (although this masks the very large votes 
of India and China); and it would take the smallest 
97 votes – more than half the membership – to form 
a constituency of average size.
The non-linear approaches again fare consid-
erably better. The square-root option gives rise to 
only two single-country constituencies (India and 
China), and two constituency-dominant countries 
(the United States and Indonesia), while the cube 
root option – uniquely among the options considered 
here – has no single-country constituencies, although 
China and India remain constituency-dominant. 
The maximum number of members required for an 
average-sized constituency declines from 84 in the 
baseline scenario to 46 in the square-root option and 
30 using the cube root.
10.8 Broad acceptability to developing countries
The severe effects of the proportional approach 
on smaller countries results in no fewer than 86 de-
veloping countries losing – more than in any other 
option except the Cooper and EU proposals. These 
countries account for 10.9 per cent of total popula-
tion, and 21.9 per cent of total votes.
Once again, however, the square-root and cube-
root options perform much better (table 10.2). In the 
square root option, only 15 developing countries lose, 
accounting for 5.0 per cent of total population, and 
12.2 per cent of the vote. In the cube root option, the 
number of developing countries which lose declines 
further, to ten. However, China and Mexico, both of 
which gain under the square-root option, lose with 
the cube root. As a result, the share of population 
accounted for by losing developing countries in-
creases to 26.7 per cent, and the share of total votes 
to 15.8 per cent. 
All three indicators for the square-root option 
are better than for any of the other approaches consid-
ered here (except for the number of countries under 
the cube-root option). 
As in other cases, the list of developing countries 
who would lose under the square-root option includes 
some of political importance, notably Argentina, the 
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Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. However, this list 
is significantly shorter than for any other option; and 
three of these four would also lose under any other 
option favourable to developing countries as a whole, 
while the fourth would lose under any favourable 
option other than the Buira proposal.
10.9 Other political considerations
While a substantial majority of the overall 
membership (110 countries, accounting for 79.8 per 
cent of total votes) lose from the proportional option, 
relatively few lose from the square root (36) and the 
cube root (28). However, the fact that these include 
most of the major developed and other high-income 
countries inevitably means that the losers account 
for a large proportion of the votes (69.6 per cent and 
72.7 per cent respectively).
On a practical level, a formula based only 
on population is the most clearly democratic and 
transparent, and has the fewest data problems of any 
option besides a pure Westphalian approach. It also 
has clear appeal intuitively, on the basis of widely 
accepted democratic principles. However, there are 
three key sticking points.
The abandonment of the principle of economic  • 
weighting will be strongly resisted by the de-
veloped countries who benefit from it.
Because population does not reflect the ability  • 
of countries to contribute to the Fund, it would 
require a decoupling of votes from quotas.
While direct proportionality is widely used and  • 
accepted, the use of non-linear formulae is not; 
and their proposal gives rise to the risk of disputes 
over which non-linear formula should be used, 
even if the general principle were accepted.
10.10  Overall assessment
The proportional option, though the simplest 
and in some respects the most appealing intuitively, 
is seriously problematic in practice, given the scale 
of the disparities in country size among IMF member 
countries. Coupled with the negative effects on the 
majority of developing countries, and of the mem-
bership as a whole, this effectively rules this option 
out. It might, however, be possible to reduce these 
problems by using it in combination with a substantial 
basic vote (see section 11) or a revised quota formula 
(see section 12).
The results of the non-linear formulae, however, 
appear much more favourable. As well as conforming 
to democratic principles, they have substantial effects 
in reducing the dispersion of votes and concentration 
of power, and increasing the representation of under-
represented groups. They also have negative effects 
on fewer (and less politically critical) developing 
countries, and are among the best options in terms 
of the total number of countries adversely affected 
(though not their total votes).
The cube root option may be seen as reducing 
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Republic of Korea  -0.33 -0.43
Russian Federation  -0.96 -1.37
Saudi Arabia  -2.41 -2.40
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their direct relationship to population. More prag-
matically, unlike the square-root option, it has a 
negative effect on China – a major obstacle in view 
of China’s importance to the political process. This 
suggests that the square-root option may in practice 
be preferable. In view of its other advantages, this 
option merits serious consideration as a basis for a 
common developing country position.
11.  Democratic principles II:  
basic vote plus population
An alternative to non-linear functions of popu-
lation as a means of dealing with the problem of 
the direct proportionality approach is to combine a 
component of the vote directly proportional to popu-
lation with an equal vote per country, following the 
principle of the current basic vote. Three possible 
combinations are considered here, setting the basic 
vote at 25 per cent, 50 per cent and 75 per cent of 
the total. The effects of alternative percentages can 
be estimated by interpolation (or extrapolation) from 
these results.
The assessment of these options is summarized 
in table 11.1.
11.1 Congruence with democratic principles
This approach is based exclusively on the two 
democratic principles of “one-person-one vote” and 
“one-country-one-vote”. By definition, it therefore has 
a “democratic shortfall” as defined above, of zero.
11.2 Adequate representation for all 
individual countries 
The smallest vote is increased considerably even 
in the 25 per cent option, to 0.14 per cent (compared 
with 0.02 per cent in the baseline. As the basic vote 
increases to 50 per cent and 75 per cent, the mini-
mal population component for the smallest country 
means that this figure increases almost exactly pro 
rata, to 0.27 per cent and 0.41 per cent respectively. 
Equally, however, the very limited role of population 
differences in determining the vote at the lower end 
of the scale means that the votes at the 90th and 80th 
percentiles are not significantly larger.
11.3 Avoidance of domination by one  
(or a few) country(s)
As in the “population-only” options, dominance 
by developed country groupings disappears in all 
three options. The share of the G7 declines from 
9.4 per cent in the 25 per cent option to 5.7 per cent in 
the 75 per cent option; that of the EU increases from 
9.4 per cent to 12.9 per cent; and that of the OECD 
declines slightly, from 17.8 per cent to 16.8 per cent. 
(By definition, all are between the shares of the group 
concerned in membership and in population.)
In terms of the concentration of votes, the 25 per 
cent option performs somewhat better than the base-
line. One country (China) still has a vote in excess of 
15 per cent; but the number of countries required for 
an overall majority is increased from nine to 14. The 
50 per cent options improves both indicators substan-
tially, and the 75 per cent option considerably: the 
number of countries required for a 15 per cent vote 
increases to two and six respectively, and the number 
required for a 50 per cent vote to 34 and 66.
11.4 Proportionality of difference between 
countries
The inter-quartile range of votes declines from 
2.7 (comparable to the cube-root option) in the 25 per 
cent option to 1.6 (comparable to the 50 per cent basic 
vote option) at 50 per cent, and 1.2 (the lowest of any 
option considered here) in the 75 per cent option. As 
in these other cases, this degree of compression might 
prove problematic. The last two figures are also the 
lowest relative to population of any option consid-
ered here, at 0.12 and 0.09, reflecting a considerable 
degree of compression of the range of country votes 
compared to population. (The corresponding figure 
for the 75 per cent option is 0.2, slightly higher than 
the cube-root option.)
A key feature of the population plus basic vote 
option is that, while differences are very marked at 
the top end of the population scale, they are extremely 
small at the bottom. Thus, in the 25 per cent option, 
the United States (population 296m) has slightly 
more than double the vote of Bangladesh (population 
142m), while Portugal (population 10.6m) has less 
than double the vote of Palau (population 20,000). 
While differentiation narrows among higher popu-
lation countries as the basic vote increases, it also 
narrows still further among the smallest countries. 31 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
With a basic vote of 75 per cent, the United States 
vote is somewhat more than double that of the Philip-
pines (population 83m); but even Mexico (population 
103m) has less than double Palau’s vote.
While this is a matter of subjective judgement, 
this asymmetry between differentiation at the top and 
the bottom of the population distribution would seem 
to represent a significant disadvantage of this approach 
relative to non-linear functions of population. 
11.5 Appropriate balance between “creditor” 
and “borrowing” countries
As in the population-only options, the absence 
of economic weighting means that “creditor domi-
nance” disappears in the basic vote plus population 
approach. The share of high-income countries in the 
total vote, by definition, lies between their share in 
membership and their share in population, increas-
ing from 16.8 per cent in the 25 per cent option to 
Table 11.1
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Democratic principles Explicit democratic  link (%) 4.2 100 100 100
“Democratic shortfall” 62.7 0 0 0
Individual country Smallest vote (%) 0.02 0.14 0.27 0.41
representation 90th percentile vote (%) 0.03 0.14 0.27 0.41
80th percentile vote (%) 0.05 0.15 0.28 0.41
Non-dominance G7 vote (%) 43.7 9.4 7.5 5.7 11.3 3.8
EU vote (%) 31.7 9.4 11.2 12.9 7.7 14.7
OECD vote (%) 63.2 17.8 17.3 16.8 18.3 16.3
Countries for 15% +1 1 1 2 6
Countries for 50% +1 9 14 34 66
Proportionality Inter-quartile range 7.8 2.7 1.6 1.2
IQR relative to population 1.2 0.2 0.12 0.09
Debtor/creditor High-income country vote (%) 65.3 16.8 18.3 19.7 15.4 21.2
balance HIC/LMIC per country (ratio) 7.0 0.75 0.93 0.91
HIC/LMIC relative to population 10.3 1.11 1.23 1.35
Country group HIPC vote (%) 3.1 12 15.2 18.5 8.7 21.7
representation Other PRGF vote (%) 5.7 27.3 24.1 22.9 29.6 20.7
Other developing countries vote (%) 26.0 43.9 41.4 38.9 46.3 36.4
Transition economies vote (%) 7.7 8.4 10.5 12.6 6.3 14.7
Symmetrical Single-country constituencies 6 3 2 2
constituencies Constituency-dominant countries 7 7 2 0
Maximum countries for average 
constituency
84 31 16 11
Developing Number of countries 22 19 17
country losers % of population 10.2 9.9 13.7
% of total votes 18.4 17.7 18.2
Political feasibility Total losers 44 40 34
% of total votes 76.6 75.7 74.7
% of population 24 23.7 27.132 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
19.7 per cent in the 75 per cent option. Compared 
with low-/middle-income countries, they are thus 
slightly under-represented relative to population 
(by 25 per cent in the 25 per cent option, declining 
to 9 per cent in the 75 per cent option) and slightly 
over-represented on a per-member basis (by a margin 
increasing from 11 per cent to 35 per cent).
11.6 Adequacy of representation for all 
country groups
Representation of all developing country groups 
considered here is increased in all three options, in 
most cases substantially. The HIPC countries fare 
best, their vote being increased by a factor of nearly 
four from the baseline scenario in the 15 per cent 
option, rising to six at 75 per cent, and exceeding 
the 15 per cent threshold at 50 per cent and 75 per 
cent. Least favourably affected are the transition 
economies, whose vote is increased only marginally 
by the 25 per cent option, from 7.7 per cent to 8.4 per 
cent, rising further to 12.6 per cent (but remaining 
below the 15 per cent threshold) in the 75 per cent 
per cent option.
Other developing country groups, however, do 
somewhat better with a smaller than a larger basic 
vote, once again largely reflecting the presence of 
India and China. The total vote of the “other PRGF” 
countries increases by a factor of nearly five (to 
27.3 per cent) in the 25 per cent option, falling back 
to four (22.9 per cent) at 75 per cent; that of the non-
PRGF group increases from 26.0 per cent to 43.9 per 
cent in the 25 per cent option, but only to 38.9 per 
cent in the 75 per cent option.
11.7 Symmetry of constituencies
The number of single-country constituencies, 
though much smaller than in the baseline scenario 
(six) is relatively little affected by the size of the basic 
vote. India and China have a sufficient vote to form 
their own constituencies in all three scenarios, and 
are joined by the United States with the basic vote at 
25 per cent. The number of constituency-dominant 
countries is reduced much more sharply, however, 
from seven at 25 per cent to two at 50 per cent and 
zero at 75 per cent.
The basic vote plus population approach per-
forms particularly well in terms of the maximum 
number of countries required to form an average 
constituency, which falls from 84 in the baseline 
scenario to 31 with the basic vote at 25 per cent, 16 
at 50 per cent, and 11 at 75 per cent.
11.8 Broad acceptability to developing 
countries
Relatively few developing countries lose on 
the basis of the basic vote plus population approach. 
22 countries lose in the 25 per cent scenario, 19 in the 
50 per cent scenario, and 17 in the 75 per cent sce-
nario. This is broadly in line with the increased basic 
vote options (20 countries), and slightly more than the 
non-linear population functions (10–15). However, 
while the shares of population and of votes repre-
sented by these countries decline slightly between 
25 per cent and 50 per cent, it increases between 
50 per cent and 75 per cent, and the population share 
is substantially higher at 75 per cent than at 25 per 
cent (13.7 per cent compared with 10.2 per cent). It is 
noteworthy that the minimum figures for population 
and votes are respectively double and 50 per cent 
higher than those for the square-root option.
Importantly, however, these include a number 
of potentially key players politically (see table 11.2). 
These include Argentina, the Republic of Korea, Ma-
laysia, Mexico, the Russian Federation, South Africa 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at all three 
levels of basic vote, with Chile also losing at 25 per 
cent and 50 per cent, and Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
and Brazil at 75 per cent. This would appear to be 
problematic from a political perspective. There is 
also a notably strong Latin American presence on 
this list: while the total vote of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries is increased, this masks a strong 
shift of votes from the larger mainland countries to 
the smaller countries of Central America and the 
Caribbean as the basic vote increases.
11.9 Other political considerations
On a practical level, the basic vote plus popu-
lation approach shares with the population-only 
approaches the advantages of conformity with rec-
ognised democratic principles, transparency, and the 
absence of data problems. It has further advantages 
relative to the square- and cube-root approaches of 
greater simplicity and consequently intuitive ap-
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In terms of the voting calculus, the total number 
of losers from this approach is also more limited than 
for the quota-based options (or the proportional ap-
proach), ranging between 34 and 44. However, the 
inclusion of the countries with the largest quotas 
among the losers means that they account for a large 
proportion of the total vote (75–77 per cent).
11.10  Overall assessment
The basic vote plus population approach offers 
considerable advantages to developing countries as a 
whole, and to all developing country groups (with the 
notable exception of OPEC). It also has the advantage 
over the non-linear approach of clarity and simplicity. 
However, it has two significant disadvantages, one 
technical, and one political.
On a technical level, this approach not only  • 
entails a high degree of compressions of country 
differentials, but is extremely asymmetric in 
the degree of differentiation between countries 
at the top, and at the bottom of the population 
scale. This can also be expected to give rise to 
reluctance and/or resistance among countries 
other than those near the very top or towards 
the bottom of the scale.
Politically, a number of major developing coun- • 
tries would face a reduction in their votes from 
this approach. There is also a disproportionate 
effect on Latin America in this regard.
These issues – particularly the latter – would 
seem to suggest a case for preferring the square 
root option over the basic vote plus population ap-
proach.
12.  Mixed approaches: Mirakhor and 
Zaidi
In a recent IMF working paper (Mirakhor and 
Zaidi, 2006), the Iranian Executive Director to the 
IMF (and Dean of the Board) Abbas Mirakhor and 
his colleague Iqbal Zaidi propose an approach which 
combines three factors:
an increase in the basic vote; • 
a second basic vote, proportional to popula- • 
tion; and
a modified quota formula, which combines  • 
indicators of countries’ ability to finance the 
Fund (“supply variables”) with indicators of 
their potential need to borrow from the Fund 
(“demand variables”).
It has not been possible to undertake a rigorous 
assessment of this approach due to time constraints, 
the limited amount of detail on the application of 
the quota formula in the paper, and data constraints. 
This section therefore presents only a first, tentative 
and very approximate, attempt at assessment. These 
limitations should be borne in mind throughout.
Table 11.2




Algeria  -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
Argentina  -0.37 -0.38 -0.40
Brazil -0.22
Bulgaria  -0.08
Chile  -0.07 0.00
Czech Republic  -0.13 -0.03
Hungary  -0.23 -0.13 -0.03
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) -0.01
Iraq  -0.06 -0.04 -0.02
Israel  -0.22 -0.11
Kuwait  -0.47 -0.34 -0.22
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  -0.31 -0.20 -0.09
Malaysia  -0.24 -0.21 -0.17
Mexico  -0.07 -0.33 -0.60
Poland  -0.04 -0.06 -0.07
Republic of Korea  -0.61 -0.67 -0.72
Romania  -0.09 -0.04
Russian Federation  -0.83 -1.26 -1.68
Saudi Arabia  -2.69 -2.65 -2.61
Singapore  -0.22 -0.10
South Africa  -0.18 -0.22 -0.26
Trinidad and Tobago  -0.02
Ukraine -0.04
United Arab Emirates  -0.10
Venezuela  
   (Bolivarian Rep. of)
-0.75 -0.72 -0.69
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The components of the Mirakhor and Zaidi ap-
proach are set out in table 12.1, and the modifications 
made for the purposes of this paper are indicated in 
the final column. These are primarily a result of data 
constraints, with the exception of the short-term debt/
reserves indicator. (It has also been necessary to fill 
a small number of gaps in the readily available data 
with approximations or averages.) 
The short-term debt/reserves indicator has been 
excluded because, while it differentiates well between 
developing countries with different levels of risk, as 
intended, the ratio is generally much higher in de-
veloped than in developing countries. Its inclusion 
therefore has the perverse effect of indicating much 
higher demand for resources in developed than in 
developing countries.
The two “supply” variables were converted into 
indices (maximum = 100), and given equal weight to 
determine the supply-side component of the quota. 
On the “demand” side, current payments/receipts 
and variability of current receipts were combined 
similarly, and multiplied by a factor combining the 
three ratio/index indicators (past IMF-supported 
programmes, credit ratings and reserves/monetary 
base), similarly scaled and again given equal weight. 
It should be noted that this is not necessarily the only 
way in which these variables could be applied, and 
that different approaches could give rise to signifi-
cantly different results.
The weights applied to the different components 
have been selected from the proposed ranges with 
the objective of maximising the potential benefits 
to developing countries. Therefore the maximum 
levels proposed have been used for the Westphalian 
and Democracy principles (15 per cent and 10 per 
cent respectively); the minimum for the “supply” 
component of the quota formula (45 per cent); and 
the residual (30 per cent) for the “demand” compo-
nent. 
Table 12.1
MIRAkHOR AND ZAIDI: BASIC VOTES AND VARIABLES FOR qUOTA FORMULAS
Percent of vote Modifications
Basic vote I (Westphalian Principle) 4–15
Basic vote II (Democracy Principle) 5–10
quota Formula
(a) Supply Variables 45–55
      PPP-Based GDP
      International reserves
(b) Demand Variables 25–35
      Current payments or receipts Total of current payments and receipts
      Variability of current receipts
      Past IMF-supported programmes Proportion of years in which IMF resources disbursed, 
1980-2006
      Capital flows/GDP Omitted due to data problems
      Subinvestment grade credit rating Index, based on Fitch credit ratings
      Sovereign bond spreads Omitted due to data problems
      Reserves/short-term debt Omitted due to perverse effects (see text)
      Reserves/financing gap Omitted due to data/definition problems
      Reserves/monetary base Reserves/M235 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
The assessment indicators for this proposal, 
estimated on the basis of the above assumptions, are 
summarized in table 12.2.
12.1 Congruence with democratic principles
The explicitly democratic component of the vote 
in the Mirakhor and Zaidi proposal (as considered 
here) is the 25 per cent accounted for by the two 
basic votes. The correlation coefficient between the 
quota and population is 0.542 – between the baseline 
level (0.346) and that for the Buira proposal (0.644). 
This gives a “democratic shortfall” of 34.3 per cent, 
almost identical to the Buira proposal, the larger ex-
plicitly democratic component off-setting the lower 
correlation coefficient.
Table 12.2







Democratic Explicit democratic  link (%) 4.2 25.0
principles “Democratic shortfall” 62.7 34.3
Individual country Smallest vote (%) 0.02 0.08
representation 90th percentile vote (%) 0.03 0.09
80th percentile vote (%) 0.05 0.10
Non-dominance G7 vote (%) 43.7 35.7 11.3 3.8
EU vote (%) 31.7 24.7 7.7 14.7
OECD vote (%) 63.2 54.0 18.3 16.3
Countries for 15% +1 1 2
Countries for 50% +1 9 11
Proportionality Inter-quartile range 7.8 3.9
IQR relative to population 1.2 0.45
Debtor/creditor High-income country vote (%) 65.3 55.4 15.4 21.2
balance HIC/LMIC per country (ratio) 7.0 4.6
HIC/LMIC relative to population 10.3 6.8
Country group HIPC vote (%) 3.1 4.9 8.7 21.7
representation Other PRGF vote (%) 5.7 9.2 29.6 20.7
Other dev’ing countries vote (%) 26.0 30.5 46.3 36.4
Transition economies vote (%) 7.7 7.6 6.3 14.7
Symmetrical Single-country constituencies 6 4
constituencies Constituency-dominant countries 7 7
Maximum countries for average 
constituency
84 46
Developing Number of countries 27
country losers % of population 17.0
% of total votes 18.3
Political feasibility Total losers 43
% of total votes 67.5
% of population 27.736 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
12.2 Adequate representation for all 
individual countries
The smallest vote is increased fourfold in this 
proposal, from 0.02 per cent to 0.08 per cent; but the 
absolute gradient of the vote is slightly less than in 
the baseline in the bottom quintile, so that the vote 
increases only to 0.09 per cent at the 90th percentile, 
and 0.11 per cent at the 80th. Nonetheless, this repre-
sents a substantial improvement overall.
12.3 Avoidance of domination by one  
(or a few) country(s)
The Mirakhor and Zaidi proposal reduces the 
votes of the major developed country groups to a 
moderate extent compared with the baseline scenario: 
that of the G7 from 43.7 per cent to 35.7 per cent, 
the EU’s from 31.7 per cent to 24.7 per cent, and the 
OECD’s from 63.2 per cent to 54.0 per cent. It will be 
noted, however, that the OECD retains a significant 
overall majority of the vote.
The number of countries required for a major-
ity vote is increased, but only from nine to 11. More 
positively, however, no country has 15 per cent of 
the vote.
12.4 Proportionality of difference between 
countries
The dispersion of votes is reduced substantially 
by the Mirakhor and Zaidi option, being halved from 
7.8 in the baseline option to 3.9. While the inter-
quartile range relative to population is an unreliable 
indicator for quota-based options, its value of 0.45 
is roughly in line with the 25 per cent basic vote 
option.
12.5 Appropriate balance between “creditor” 
and “borrowing” countries
As presented here, the Mirakhor and Zaidi 
option results in a moderate shift of voting power 
from “creditor” to “borrowing” countries, reducing 
the high-income countries’ share of the vote from 
65.3 per cent to 55.4 per cent. However, high-income 
countries retain a substantial overall majority of the 
vote, and remain considerably over-represented rela-
tive to low-/middle-income countries, both on a per 
member basis (by a factor of 4.6) and per capita (by 
a factor of 6.8).
12.6 Adequacy of representation for all 
country groups 
Developing country groupings’ representation 
is increased significantly by the Mirakhor and Zaidi 
option, and increases are broadly in inverse propor-
tion to levels of development. The HIPC countries’ 
votes are increased from 3.1 per cent to 4.9 per cent; 
those of other PRGF countries from 5.7 per cent to 
9.2 per cent; and those of non-PRGF countries from 
26.0 per cent to 30.5 per cent. However, all remain 
substantially below their shares of membership and of 
population; and the vote of the transition economies 
is reduced marginally, from 7.7 per cent to 7.6 per 
cent.
12.7 Symmetry of constituencies 
The Mirakhor and Zaidi proposal reduces the 
asymmetry of the constituency system primarily at 
the bottom of the scale, through its substantial posi-
tive effect on the smallest votes. Thus the maximum 
number of countries required to form a constitu-
ency with an average vote is reduced from 84 in the 
baseline scenario to 46. There is also a more modest 
effect at the top of the distribution: the number of 
single-country constituencies is reduced from six 
to four, while the number of constituency-dominant 
countries remains unchanged at seven.
12.8 Broad acceptability to developing 
countries
In total, 27 developing countries lose voting 
share under the Mirakhor and Zaidi proposal, as 
presented here, accounting for 18.3 per cent of the 
total vote and 17.0 per cent of population (table 12.3). 
Once again, these include a large number of countries 
of importance to any potential developing country 
coalition. Almost all the major countries of Latin 
America are particularly adversely affected, as are 
some sub-Saharan countries, while Asian countries 
(with the exception of Sri Lanka) gain consistently.37 IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
12.9 Other political considerations
If one takes as given the threefold role of quotas 
(see section 13), a strong case can be made for the 
two key features of the general approach proposed 
by Mirakhor and Zaidi – the additional population-
weighted basic vote and the explicit inclusion in the 
quota formula of “demand” variables. However, as 
for other options benefiting developing countries as a 
whole, there are a substantial number (43) of losers, 
who account for a large majority (67.5 per cent) of 
the total votes.
These countries can therefore be expected to 
focus on potential weaknesses of this proposal. The 
most vulnerable aspects, given the tenor of discus-
sions to date in the Quota Review, are its complexity 
and potential data problems. Consideration could 
usefully be given to modifying the proposal to in-
crease its simplicity and transparency, and to ensure 
that comprehensive and up-to-date data are readily 
available for all the variables included.
12.10  Overall assessment
The broad approach proposed by Mirakhor and 
Zaidi – the addition of a second, population-weight-
ed, basic vote, and the incorporation of “demand 
variables” in the quota formula – have potentially 
substantial advantages to developing countries within 
the existing quota system. This makes it potentially 
valuable as a fall-back from a democratic option 
coupled with a separation of voting from financial 
contributions and access to Fund resources. (see 
section 14.5.)
The estimated effects of the Mirakhor and Zaidi 
proposal, as presented here, are somewhat disap-
pointing relative to other options. In particular, the 
shift of votes from developed/”creditor” countries to 
developing/”borrowing” countries, and the increase 
in representation for PRGF-eligible countries are 
significantly weaker than for the Buira option. Given 
the positive effects of the higher basic vote (15 per 
cent as against 4.2 per cent) and the inclusion of a 
population-based vote, this suggests that the Mira-
khor and Zaidi quota formula, as it has been applied 
here, performs substantially less well than the Buira 
version.
However, as emphasised at the beginning of 
this section, the assessment here is highly imperfect, 
due to time and data constraints; and alternative 
formulations, using the same variables would also 
be possible. These results should not, therefore, be 
interpreted as indicating a case for rejecting the Mira-
khor and Zaidi option. Rather, they indicate a need for 
further analysis, using alternative formulations and 
combinations of indicators on the “demand” side of 
the quota formula, to bring the results more closely 
into line with actual borrowing needs. Depending on 
Table 12.3




















Russian Federation  -0.52
Saudi Arabia  -1.70
Serbia and Montenegro  -0.02
South Africa  -0.39
Sri Lanka  -0.04
Trinidad and Tobago  -0.02
Ukraine  -0.26
Uruguay  -0.02
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) -0.58
Zambia  -0.11
   Total countries 2738 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 49
the results of such analysis, an alternative would be 
to retain the principle of an additional, population-
weighted, basic vote with an alternative quota 
formula such as that proposed by Buira.
13. Challenging the triple role of quotas
Unsurprisingly, the only options which increase 
the voting power of developing countries signifi-
cantly are those based on the democratic principles 
of one-country-one-vote or population-weighted vot-
ing rather than economic weighting. As long as the 
principle of economically-weighted voting remains, 
it will inevitably skew voting power to those coun-
tries with the greatest economic weight – that is the 
developed countries – and away from developing, 
and especially low-income, countries.
However, basing quotas on democratic prin-
ciples is fundamentally problematic as the Fund is 
currently constituted because of the triple role of 
quotas as the determinant, not only of voting power, 
but also of access to Fund resources (and most prob-
lematically) of financial contributions to the Fund.
As long as each country’s share of votes is 
equal to its share of total financial contributions, a 
democratic basis for decision-making will result in 
the Fund being inadequately financed, because all 
members’ contributions will be constrained by the 
financial capacity of the poorest members. Democ-
ratisation therefore requires a separation of the three 
roles which quotas now perform. 
(A similar tension also arises between the roles 
of quotas as a determinant of financial contributions 
and of access to Fund resources. To the extent that 
total quotas represent the total capacity of the Fund 
to lend, this means that the majority of its notional 
lending capacity is for (developed and other creditor) 
countries, who have not borrowed from the Fund for 
25 years, and are unlikely to do so in future.)
The question of whether the threefold purpose 
of quotas remains appropriate is therefore central 
to the consideration of IMF voting reform. Beyond 
the issue of democratic principles. a strong case can 
be made for delinking voting power from financial 
contributions and access to Fund resources on the 
basis of three other considerations:
the incentive effects generated by the combina- • 
tion of the three roles in the context of quota 
reviews;
the fundamental changes which have occurred  • 
in the nature of the Fund and the context in 
which it operates since the system was estab-
lished in 1944; and
the subsequent adoption and intensification  • 
of policy conditionality attached to the use of 
Fund resources.
13.1 Incentive effects
Since developed countries are no longer de-
pendent on borrowing from the Fund, they have 
no incentive to increase quotas beyond the need to 
ensure that the Fund is able to lend sufficiently to 
developing countries in the event of debt or financial 
crises; and a disincentive, to the extent that increases 
would increase their financial contributions. 
Moreover, the developed countries have suc-
ceeded in reducing their own need for quota increases 
by increasingly emphasising the Fund’s “catalytic 
role” in facilitating access to resources from other 
sources over its direct financing role. While this has 
no basis in the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, it allows 
the total resources available to deal with financial 
crises to be increased, and the Fund’s policy leverage 
over borrowing countries to be maintained, without 
increasing quotas. This further strengthens the incen-
tive of developed countries to resist quota increases.
For most developing countries, by contrast, their 
actual or potential dependency of on IMF resources 
gives them a strong interest in increasing quotas. 
However, their limited voting power means that their 
only political option is, at best, to block a quota re-
view which is not in their interests; and the result of 
doing so is for quotas (and thus the ability to borrow) 
to remain unchanged in nominal terms, while the 
distribution of voting power remains unchanged. 
The developed countries, by threatening to 
block any quota review which does not protect their 
voting power, are thus in a position to force on devel-
oping countries a choice between, on the one hand, 
a quota review which increases their access to Fund 
resources, but perpetuates a voting system weighted 
against them; and, on the other, a freeze (in nominal 
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a continuation of the current voting weights, for the 
following five years. In these circumstances, borrow-
ing countries have little incentive to choose the latter 
option, making it very difficult to hold together any 
potential coalition of borrowing members.
Should there nonetheless be a potential chal-
lenge, the option of ad hoc quota increases for selected 
developing countries provides an opportunity for 
the developed countries to “buy off” developing 
countries accounting for sufficient of the vote to 
allow the quota review to be agreed. Moreover, the 
weighted voting system skews this process towards 
those countries which already have the largest quotas 
– primarily other high- and middle-income countries. 
Thus the current proposal on quotas (IMF, 2006a) 
provides for ad hoc increases, with initial partial 
increases ahead of agreement on the overall review, 
for four large high- and middle-income developing 
countries (China, the Republic of Korea, Mexico and 
Turkey) together accounting for 5.35 per cent of the 
votes in the IMF.
By contrast, the primary concern of smaller and 
poorer developing countries – increases in the basic 
vote in the Fund – was the subject only of a com-
mitment to limited future action (a doubling of basic 
votes). While this is a condition for the completion 
of the review, this was achieved only as a result of 
a public protest by the African Executive Directors, 
which resulted in media and civil society pressure on 
developed country Directors.
The incentive of developed countries to limit 
quota increases, coupled with their ability largely to 
determine the outcome of quota reviews has limited 
the extent of quota increases. Five of the twelve 
quinquennial quota reviews have resulted in quotas 
remaining unchanged, the overall increase in other 
reviews being between 30.7 per cent and 50.9 per cent 
(IMF, 2003, table 2). As a result, they have fallen far 
behind the growth of the global economy. Despite 
the fourfold increase in the membership of the Fund, 
total quotas declined from 4 per cent to 1 per cent of 
world gross domestic product, and from 58 per cent 
to 4 per cent of world imports between 1944 and 2000 
(Buira, 2003a, table 3). 
13.2 The Fund’s changing nature and context
The weighted voting system is partly a reflection 
of the dramatic changes in the political culture since 
the Fund was founded in the 1940s, when much of 
the developing world remained under colonial rule. 
This both meant that most of the poorest countries 
in the world were excluded from the negotiations 
which led to the foundation of the Fund, and thus 
the design of its governance structures, but also no 
doubt coloured attitudes among the participants to 
what could be considered acceptable.
As important, however, are the fundamental 
changes which have occurred in the nature and role 
of the Fund and the global economic context in 
which it operates, and the failure of its governance 
structures to adapt accordingly. Both phenomena, in 
turn, are in large measure attributable to the Fund’s 
governance structure, and particularly the weighted 
voting system itself.
The IMF was established following the 1944 
Bretton Woods Conference primarily by and for 
developed countries and better-off developing 
countries, mostly in Latin America,2 while most of 
the poorer developing countries (including almost 
the entire of Africa, South Asia and the Anglophone 
Caribbean) remained under colonial rule. It was es-
sentially a “club” made up of a minority of countries, 
but has since been transformed into an institution 
whose membership is almost universal and, for most 
(developing) countries, virtually inescapable. The 
only countries of significant size which are not now 
members of the IMF are Cuba and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea.
The Fund’s primary role was to provide oc-
casional financial support to its members when they 
faced temporary balance of payments problems as 
a result of current account imbalances, pending ad-
justment of their economic policies to restore more 
lasting balance, within a global financial system 
characterized by fixed exchange rates (linked to gold) 
and strict capital controls.
This context has changed fundamentally. The 
fixed exchange rate system and the link with gold 
were abandoned in the 1970s; and the original system 
of capital controls, inscribed in the Fund’s Articles 
of Agreement, has given way to widespread capital 
account liberalisation (actively promoted by the 
Fund itself). Party as a result, international financial 
transactions are incomparably larger in volume, and 
radically different in nature, from the 1940s. Total for-
eign exchange transactions reached $1,800 billion per 
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and 35 times that of global trade in goods), including 
forms such as derivatives which were unthought-of 
when the Fund was founded (BIS, 2005).
The combination of these changes in member-
ship and context has led to equally fundamental 
changes in the nature of the Fund’s role. Firstly, as 
developed countries have become more financially 
secure, they have ceased to require borrowing from 
the Fund. While IMF support to developed countries 
was commonplace until the 1970s, it has not lent 
to a developed country since the end of Iceland’s 
programme in the early 1980s. Following the con-
troversial response to the 1990s financial crisis, 
there are clear signs that this trend is broadening, 
as governments in “emerging market” economies 
in Asia are building their international reserves to 
unprecedented levels and developing regional crisis 
prevention mechanisms to avoid the need to rely on 
IMF support in the future, while major borrowers in 
both Asia and Latin America are repaying their debts 
to the Fund ahead of schedule. 
This has resulted in a polarisation of the Fund’s 
membership, giving rise to a fundamental change in 
its nature.
It has gone from being a credit cooperative 
from which all members draw resources from 
time to time, and therefore have an interest in 
credit being available on reasonable terms and 
conditions, to being an institution formed by 
two distinct groups of countries – industrial 
country creditors and developing country debt-
ors (Buira, 2003b: 229).
Secondly, the expansion of the Fund’s member-
ship has brought in a large number of countries at a 
much lower level of development in relative terms 
than was originally the case. Together with the eco-
nomic shocks of the 1970s and subsequent decades, 
this means that, beyond the temporary liquidity 
problems for which the Fund was designed, a large 
part of its membership is facing solvency problems 
requiring debt cancellation rather than new lending 
– a problem the Fund was not designed to address. 
While there has been some evolution in the instru-
ments available to the Fund to deal with insolvency 
(concessional lending and partial debt cancellation), 
the continuation of the debt crisis of low-income 
countries after 25 years indicates that this remains 
inadequate. A strong case can be made that this is 
attributable in part to the dominance of creditor 
countries in the Fund’s decision-making.
13.3	Conditionality	and	policy	influence
Perhaps the most important change in the Fund’s 
role from the perspective of voting reform is in the 
nature of its support to its borrowing members. This 
reflects in large measure the shift of its operations 
from developed to developing countries, and its 
very different power relations with the two groups. 
Specifically, the Fund has taken a much more active 
role in determining the economic policies of member 
countries when they borrow, setting increasingly 
detailed conditions for continued disbursement. 
While this is now effectively the Fund’s primary 
role, particularly as the development of its “catalytic 
role” has reduced the relative importance of its own 
lending, it was not a feature of the Fund’s original 
role, as the United States pressure for policy condi-
tionality was almost universally opposed by other 
countries.
In the discussions in Atlantic City in June 1944, 
prior to the Bretton Woods conference, the US 
delegates raised the subject of requiring mem-
ber countries that requested financial support to 
give certain policy undertakings to the Fund, 
which would decide whether the currency 
purchase was consistent with the purposes of 
the Fund; this notion was strongly rejected. 
Virtually all other countries believed that ac-
cess to Fund resources should be automatic and 
unchallenged. Moreover, they felt that Fund 
intrusion into their internal affairs would be 
intolerable (Buira, 2003a: 84).
While an Executive Board decision in 1952 
established a link between use of IMF resources and 
national policies, the principle of conditionality was 
incorporated into the Articles of Agreement only in 
1969. This was primarily a reflection of the concern 
on the part of creditor countries to “preserve the 
revolving character of the Fund’s resources” (Buira, 
2003a).
Moreover, the scope of the Fund’s role in policy 
conditionality has extended considerably since. The 
average number of conditions in IMF programmes 
increased from about six in the 1970s to ten in 
the 1980s (Kapur and Webb, 2000), continuing to 
increase through the 1990s. The programmes for 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand in the wake of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, each included between 
73 and 140 conditions, and that for Turkey in 2002 
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tion of the extension of IMF conditionality from the 
strictly macroeconomic to a much broader range of 
structural policy issues, such as trade and investment 
liberalisation, market deregulation and privatisation 
since the 1980s, and to governance issues since the 
mid-1990s, particularly in low-income countries 
and “transition” economies. The average number of 
structural conditions per programme year increased 
from two in 1987 to a peak of 16 in 1997, falling back 
only to 12 in 1999 (Buira, 2003a, figure 1: 61).
The proliferation of conditionality has arguably 
undermined the Fund’s effectiveness in performing 
its original (i.e. financing) role, leading to a corre-
sponding increase in incidence of programme failure 
since the mid-1980s (Buira, 2003a, table 2). The 
Meltzer Report found that “detailed conditionality 
(often including dozens of conditions) has burdened 
IMF programs in recent years, and made such pro-
grams unwieldy, highly conflictive, time consuming 
to negotiate, and often ineffectual” (Meltzer, 2000). 
There is no question, however, that conditional-
ity, and its continued extension long after its failings 
became clear, represents an imposition by developed 
countries on developing countries, by virtue of their 
dominance of decision-making. As Rustomjee ob-
serves,
Despite clear and mounting evidence over 
many years that programme conditionality 
had become excessive, irrelevant and counter-
productive to the interests of the programmes 
themselves, decisions approved by the Ex-
ecutive Board continued, over several years, 
to favour excessive conditionality in IMF-
supported programmes. This was despite re-
peated and well-argued objections by the debtor 
countries in the board, both to the IMF’s policy 
on conditionality, and to the manner in which it 
was being implemented (Rustomjee, 2005).
This significance of the increasing role of con-
ditionality is greatly reinforced by the change in the 
nature of the negotiation process associated with 
the shifting balance of bargaining power between 
the Fund and borrowing members. When the Fund 
lent mainly to developed countries, they had rela-
tively strong economies (notwithstanding temporary 
shocks), strong and well-resourced governments with 
considerable technical capacity, substantial votes in 
the Fund (and a commensurate share in its financ-
ing), and at least partial access to external financing 
even without their support. The result was something 
akin to the Fund’s notional role (since its adoption 
of conditionality) of merely deciding whether or not 
to support a set of policies designed and adopted 
voluntarily by the national government.
In the case of developing countries, and es-
pecially smaller and poorer developing countries, 
however, the circumstances, and therefore the dynam-
ics of negotiation, are fundamentally different. Their 
long-term economic position is typically extremely 
weak, and their solvency often compromised; they 
are critically dependent on securing IMF approval 
in order to secure either external financing or debt 
cancellation; their governments are typically chroni-
cally under-resourced, with very limited technical 
capacity (much of it provided by the Fund or donors); 
and, with the exception of the largest and richest de-
veloping countries, they have a minimal role either 
in financing the Fund or in its weighted voting sys-
tem. The result is a process in which policies are in 
practice very largely designed by the IMF staff, and 
approved by the government, rather than the reverse; 
and continued support from the Fund (and, through 
cross-conditionality – the concomitant of the Fund’s 
“catalytic role” – from other funders) is subject to 
detailed conditions based on these policies, which 
are regularly monitored and strictly enforced.
Coupled with the cessation of borrowing from 
the Fund by developed countries, this gives rise to 
a serious asymmetry, between a relatively small 
minority of the membership whose policies are only 
indirectly and relatively little affected by its activities 
and decisions, but which have a substantial majority 
of the votes; and a large majority whose government 
policies and economic performance are directly and 
strongly affected by the Fund’s operations, in many 
cases for decades, but which even collectively have 
little influence in its decision-making.
13.4 The quota system: an assessment
In the Fund’s early years, given its limited mem-
bership and role, the quota system was reasonably 
functional. In a system of relatively equal countries, 
which was broadly in balance over the long term, both 
potential financial needs and capacity to finance the 
organization varied broadly in line with the size of the 
economy; and, in a voluntary association of selected 
countries, exercising little power over its members, a 
weighted voting system based on financial contribu-
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However, the expansion of the Fund’s mem-
bership has simultaneously increased the economic 
disparities between members (compounded by eco-
nomic divergence between the richest and poorest 
countries), shifted the balance of membership from 
richer to poorer countries, and incorporated coun-
tries with a need for continuous financial support 
for development over the long term rather than only 
occasional and temporary balance of payments sup-
port, and latterly with problems of insolvency rather 
than illiquidity. 
Coupled with the adoption and subsequent 
institutionalisation of the Fund’s role in policy 
conditionality, and the very unequal bargaining 
power between the Fund and borrowing (developing) 
countries, this gives the Fund a profound influence 
over national policies across much of the develop-
ing world.
At the same time, the amount developing coun-
tries can borrow from the Fund has been constrained 
by the declining level of quotas relative to the global 
economy, greatly increasing the role of the Fund in 
catalysing the resources they need from other multi-
lateral and bilateral sources – largely as a result of the 
dominance of structural creditors (primarily devel-
oped countries) in determining quota increases. The 
Fund has thus become a “gatekeeper” to most major 
sources of international finance for most low-income 
countries; and a large proportion of the new financing 
and debt cancellation to which they can gain access 
is conditional on the IMF’s lending and “seal of ap-
proval”, and thus on its policy conditions. This adds 
considerably to the costs attached to non-compliance 
with IMF conditions on both macroeconomic and 
structural economic policies.
In addition, as noted above, many low-income 
countries have, for the last 25 years, faced long-term 
solvency problems requiring debt cancellation, rather 
than short-term liquidity problems which can be 
resolved through new lending. However, the debt 
cancellation available to such countries has consist-
ently lagged behind what has been needed to restore 
solvency in many cases, as the effect of continuing 
over-indebtedness has further undermined insolvent 
countries’ economies, and thus their debt-servicing 
capacity. This has been compounded by the delays 
built in to the HIPC Initiative.
The result has been to increase dependency on 
new lending from official lenders over the long term 
in order to maintain liquidity in spite of continued 
insolvency. In consequence, the Fund’s financial sup-
port, and thus its involvement in economic policy in 
borrowing countries, far from being limited to one 
or two years, as originally envisaged, now extends 
over decades in many countries.
Thus the role of the Fund in the determination 
of its borrowing members’ policies – non-existent in 
its early years – has since the 1980s become consid-
erably more extensive, much more detailed and of 
much longer duration, while failure to comply with 
policy conditions, because of the cross-conditionality 
of funding from other sources and the much greater 
dependency on such funding, is backed by more 
serious sanctions. The Fund, through policy condi-
tionality, now exercises considerable influence over 
a broad range of economic and social policies in a 
(very large) sub-group of its members over a very 
long period, but minimal influence over the rest of 
its membership. 
In this context, the quota system is consider-
ably more problematic than it was in the early years 
of the Fund. It confers de jure power over the Fund 
on one relatively small set of (mostly developed 
country) members, while the Fund itself has simul-
taneously acquired considerable de facto power 
over another much larger set of (developing country 
members). Moreover, almost every element in the 
above process can itself be attributed, to a greater 
or lesser extent, to the dominance of the developed 
countries in the Fund’s decision-making – that is, to 
the economically-weighted voting system associ-
ated with the threefold role of quotas. This might, 
with some justification, be considered as a form of 
institutionalised quasi-colonialism.
14.  Towards a common developing 
country position: political 
considerations
As noted above, economic weighting of votes 
systematically advantages those countries with the 
greatest economic weight (primarily the developed 
countries) and disadvantages those with the least 
(broadly low- and lower-middle-income countries). 
Those with average economic weight (broadly speak-
ing, upper-middle-income countries) are generally 
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between the two depending on the specific option 
under consideration.
However, in the present context, two factors 
can be expected to skew the preferences even of 
those middle-income countries which gain only 
slightly from democratic reform towards economic 
weighting.
(a)  Voting reform will be decided on the basis of the 
current voting system, which gives a majority 
of votes to those countries which benefit from 
economic weighting, and a small minority to 
those who lose. It might therefore be expected 
that it will be easier to secure approval for a pro-
posal which accepts the principle of economic 
weighting than for one which rejects it.
(b)  Many middle-income countries are growing 
faster than the world economy as a whole, and 
expect to continue doing so. This means, firstly, 
that substantial benefits could be obtained (rela-
tive to the status quo) by bringing votes more 
closely into line with actual economic weights; 
and secondly, that the net costs/benefits to them 
of economic weighting can be expected to be-
come more favourable over the long term.
This creates a potentially important tension be-
tween low-income and “emerging market” countries, 
as low-income countries benefit relatively little from 
quota-based approaches. Moreover, the relatively 
weak performance of most low-income countries, 
most notably in sub-Saharan Africa, means that the 
costs of economic weighting to these countries will 
increase still further over time.
At the same time, however, the systematic 
disadvantage of the developing countries under any 
economically weighted voting system means that 
solidarity, and a common position among develop-
ing countries as a whole is imperative if substantial 
reform is to be secured. Resolving this dilemma will 
therefore be critical to their success.
14.1 The need for a common position
The need for a common position among devel-
oping countries arises partly because of the size of 
the vote which would be necessary even to block a 
proposal by the developed countries. However, it is 
greatly reinforced by the need to combine the very 
different political strengths of “emerging markets” 
and low-income countries.
Many “emerging market” countries have built 
up very large foreign currency reserves, partly as a 
result of a lack of faith in the IMF to prevent or re-
solve future financial crises effectively, in the light of 
the experience of the Asian and other financial crises 
of 1997–2000. This gives them both the opportunity 
and the incentive (particularly given the substantial 
financial and opportunity costs of holding large 
reserves) to “walk away” from the Fund. There has 
been widespread discussion of the development of 
alternative regional structures to the IMF, and some 
first steps in this direction in Asia under the Chiang 
Mai Initiative.
This represents a substantial threat to the devel-
oped country governments, who value developing 
countries’ membership of the Fund (especially that of 
“emerging markets”) as a means of influencing their 
economic and commercial policies, and to maintain a 
degree of control over international financial markets 
in which “emerging markets” play an increasing role. 
At the same time, the current weak financial position 
of the Fund, as a result of limited borrowing and early 
repayment of loans by middle-income countries in 
Asia and Latin America, means that the defection 
of a substantial group of countries could jeopardise 
the future of the Fund as a whole. The “walk-away” 
option is therefore critically important as a political 
lever in negotiations.
Low-income countries, by contrast, are in no 
position financially or economically to “walk away” 
from the Fund, at least without financial support or 
crisis protection from other developing countries. 
However, they have a much stronger moral case for 
increased representation. Many such countries, par-
ticularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have been subject to 
IMF conditionality for 20–25 years, and can fully ex-
pect to continue in this position for at least a decade, 
and quite possibly indefinitely; and yet their voting 
power, acting collectively, is insufficient even to block 
major policy changes which affect them directly under 
the most stringent special majority requirement.
This provides potentially important political 
leverage of a different kind, for several reasons.
(a)  There is a conspicuous injustice in countries’ 
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an institution in which they have no effective 
say.
(b)  The policies which have been imposed by IMF 
conditionality are widely seen as at least partly 
responsible for poor performance in economic 
and social indicators, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
(c)  The Make Poverty History/Global Call for Ac-
tion against Poverty campaign has given rise 
to a greatly increased level of public awareness 
and concern about the position of sub-Saharan 
Africa in at least some developed countries.
(d)  The similarity of the current situation of low-
income countries in the IMF with the colonial 
era provides highly emotive ammunition for 
political pressure. This may be given added 
resonance by the coincidence, in 2007, of the 
50th anniversary of the first sub-Saharan country 
to gain Independence and the 200th anniversary 
of the abolition of the slave trade in the United 
Kingdom.
(e)  Northern-based development NGOs represent a 
highly influential constituency, whose support 
would be much more effectively galvanised 
by a proposal which would benefit the poorest 
countries rather than entrenching their disadvan-
tage. A large number of major European NGOs 
have already signed up to a collective statement 
calling for “a truly democratic structure [in the 
IMF], which would satisfy the standards of de-
mocracy expected at the national level” (Bretton 
Woods Project, 2006).
In view of the uphill task of securing real reform 
through the existing system, it is essential politically 
to combine these two potentially important weapons 
against the developed countries – the self-interest 
dimension of the “walk-away” threat, and the public 
pressure of the moral case. 
14.2 A common demand: the democratic option
As noted above, the benefits of economic 
weighting even to “emerging market” economies are 
at best limited, and the costs to low-income countries 
are substantial and increasing. Therefore the need to 
combine the strengths of low-income and “emerg-
ing” countries suggests that the strongest basis for 
developing country governments would in principle 
be a democratic option, calculated, as far as possible, 
to ensure benefits for middle-income countries. 
Adopting a democratic model in itself has sev-
eral additional advantages in terms of public pressure 
on Northern governments.
(a)  An argument between economic weighting and 
democratic principles presents a much clearer 
choice than a choice between alternative prin-
ciples of economic weighting.
(b)  It is easier to engage the media, the public and 
politicians in a debate between basic principles 
than in a debate between specific allocations of 
votes between countries other than their own.
(c)  Unlike economic issues such as debt cancella-
tion and trade, basic democratic principles are 
widely understood and supported among the 
public in developed countries.
(d)  The contrast between economically weighted 
voting and the basic principles of democracy 
which are taken for granted at the national 
level (and among countries within the European 
Union) provides a powerful argument. For ex-
ample, demonstrating what economic weighting 
would mean in the United States, the United 
Kingdom or France would highlight the issue 
in a very tangible way in these countries – as 
would applying the principle into EU decision-
making for countries in the smaller and poorer 
member countries.
(e)  The increasing emphasis by the IMF (and 
World Bank) and some development minis-
tries (e.g. the UK Department for International 
Development, DFID) on governance issues 
in developing countries could readily be used 
to highlight the inconsistency of simultane-
ously defending a fundamentally undemocratic 
system in a global institution of which these 
countries are members.
(f)  In some countries, government rhetoric about 
“spreading democracy” could be used simi-
larly.
The foregoing discussion, applying the criteria 
adopted in this paper to the various options, suggests 
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developing country perspective is to divide votes pro-
portionally to the square root of population. However, 
this raises two issues from a political perspective: the 
position of the minority of countries which would 
lose from such an approach; and the fact that any 
option which advantages the developing countries as 
a whole necessarily disadvantages developed coun-
tries, who have a large majority of the votes.
14.3 Winners and losers: individual votes 
versus collective votes
The above analysis suggests that it is likely, and 
possibly inevitable, that the option selected as a basis 
for a common developing country position would 
give one or more better-off developing countries 
fewer votes than either the status quo or an alternative 
which accepts the principle of economic weighting. 
This may apply particularly to the members of OPEC, 
which received, and still benefit from, a major ad 
hoc quota increase following the oil price increases 
of the 1970s.
As discussed above, both the number and the 
political importance of developing countries which 
lose from reform can be minimised by adopting the 
square root approach. However, a few countries, 
including four of potential political importance will 
still lose.
Even for these countries, however, a strong case 
can be made that the primary consideration, even 
for individual governments, is the voting power for 
blocks of countries rather than that of their own coun-
try. Setting aside considerations of national status, 
the size of an individual country’s vote only allows a 
country to influence the outcome of decision-making 
processes if it confers a veto (i.e., on current IMF 
rules for special majorities, 15 per cent of the total). 
The only countries which could feasibly qualify for 
such a vote are China and India, and only if at least 
70 per cent of the vote were directly proportional to 
population.
In practice, however, it is not politically realis-
tic – or arguably reasonable – for such countries to 
insist on a vote sufficient to confer a veto. It would 
also seem politically unwise. Apart from any con-
cerns about the possible future dominance of China 
and/or India, a major weak point in the credibility of 
the current system is that it gives a veto to a single 
country (the United States). This makes it politically 
more fruitful to propose a system which removes this 
veto than one which transfers to another country (or 
two countries).
When a country’s vote does not provide it with 
a veto, it can only affect decision-making outcomes 
as part of a broader coalition. The primary considera-
tion is therefore the collective votes of each country 
together with others with which it might wish to form 
a coalition on a particular issue, which would total 
at least 15 per cent of the votes. It should therefore 
be a sufficient condition for a country to support an 
option that the collective votes of such coalitions 
should not be reduced.
Taken together, these considerations suggest 
a compelling case for a united developing country 
position behind a mutually acceptable proposal 
based on democratic principles rather than economic 
weighting – that is one in which votes are a function 
only of population.
14.4 Towards a long-term strategy
A proposal based only on population would 
not be readily accepted by the developed country 
governments, and is unlikely to be implemented 
as a result of the current Quota Review. However, 
voting reform in the IMF needs to be viewed as a 
long-term process; and the application of democratic 
principles represents a reasonable and realistic long-
term aspiration.
In any negotiation between unequal parties, 
there is, of course, a question as to whether it is 
better to ask for what one really wants or what one 
might realistically hope to get. In the present case, 
there is a very strong case for developing countries 
to adopt the former approach. The key tactical argu-
ment for a disadvantaged party to limit its demands 
in negotiations is the threat of non-engagement by 
the other party(s). A credible “walk-away” threat, 
and its potential consequences for the developed 
countries’ objectives, give them little choice but to 
engage, irrespective of developing countries’ de-
mands. Despite their institutional disadvantage as a 
result of weighted voting, the developing countries 
are, in this respect, negotiating from a position of 
some strength politically.
Secondly, given the need of the developed 
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a “feasible” option as a starting point shifts the po-
litical centre of gravity towards greater reform. By 
emphasising that any deviation from the “ideal” op-
tion is a concession, it should be possible to secure 
greater movement from the developed countries’ own 
“ideal” position. To adopt a “feasible” or “pragmatic” 
option at the outset would, in this sense, be to give 
away potentially important bargaining chips for no 
real return.
Thirdly, regular Quota Reviews are institution-
alised by the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, making 
voting reform necessarily and inescapably a long-
term negotiation process. As a result, the developed 
countries have no choice but to engage on this issue 
on a continuing (or at least recurrent) basis, unless 
and until the Articles are amended to remove this 
requirement. 
In this longer-term context, adopting a (short-
term) “feasible” option which accepts economic 
weighting as a starting point risks helping to le-
gitimise the principle, and thus to undermine the 
developing countries’ bargaining position in the 
future. 
Much of the discussion of IMF voting reform 
has been conditioned by the presumed political 
impossibility of democratic options because of the 
dominance of developed countries in the current 
system, and/or a perceived “walk-away” threat by 
some or all creditor countries.
Thus, for example, the Treasury Select Com-
mittee of the House of Commons of the United 
Kingdom identifies the United States veto on major 
policy decisions in the Fund as seriously problematic. 
However, it limits its recommendations in light of 
“the political difficulties in achieving reform of the 
voting structure”, based on the evidence they received 
from Professor Richard Portes that “The US is not 
going to give up its blocking veto and that is clear. 
That is just not on the table. We cannot expect that” 
(Treasury Select Committee, 2006, paragraph 21).
Cyrus Rustomjee likewise sees the “walk-away” 
threat as a block to any proposal which would remove 
the developed countries’ built-in majority.
Without an assured majority, creditors would 
inevitably leave the institution and the financ-
ing which underpins a major aspect of the 
institution’s work would disappear (Rustom-
jee, 2005).
Similarly, Buira rejects a one-member-one-vote 
system on the grounds that, even with equal voting 
power, 
larger countries that make larger contributions 
would tend to condition these on the adoption 
of certain policies, as is the case of the United 
Nations (UN) and several other UN agencies 
and programmes, for example the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC), Kyoto Protocol on Global 
Warming, etc (Buira, 2003a: 15–16).
However, there is a danger that such pragmatism 
will serve to legitimise the status quo, allowing the 
developed countries to focus the debate on the details 
of the weighting system rather than the principle of 
weighting votes according to economic strength. 
Thus the Government of the United Kingdom takes 
as the starting point that “There is broad agreement … 
that members’ representation should broadly reflect 
their economic weight” (HMT, 2006) (even though 
such “broad agreement” clearly does not extend to 
European civil society – Bretton Woods Project, 
2006). Similarly the IMF Managing Director’s Report 
on Implementing the Fund’s Medium-Term Strategy 
refers to “The question of a fair distribution of quotas, 
reflecting the important changes in the weight and 
role of countries in the world economy” (IMF, 2006b, 
emphasis added).
Merely to ensure that democratic principles are 
on the agenda therefore requires a clear and strong 
statement at the outset that the reform process will be 
complete only when the basic principle of IMF voting 
is that of democracy rather than economic weighting. 
Maintaining this view throughout the process could 
help considerably in sustaining momentum towards 
reform.
This could be further helped by emphasising, 
not only that any proposal falling short of generally 
recognised democratic principles does not represent 
a definitive solution to the issue, and that even par-
tial acceptance of economic weighting represents 
a concession, but also that it has been imposed on 
developing countries by virtue of the existing (un-
democratic) voting system. To the extent possible, a 
public indication should be given of the proportion 
of IMF member countries, and of the proportion of 
total population they represent, which oppose any 
option presented. (Given the secrecy of Executive 
Board discussions, however, this would require the 
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14.5 The need for a common fall-back
As well as an agreed starting point, the develop-
ing countries also need a common fall-back position, 
or at least agreement on the direction in which they 
are willing to fall back, if are to negotiate effectively 
as a block. There are several possible approaches 
here. These include:
(a)  improvement in the quota formulae through 
changes which disproportionately benefit de-
veloping countries (e.g. using PPP rather than 
market exchange rates to calculate GDP);
(b)  incorporating population into the quota formula, 
to add a democratic aspect;
(c)  a larger increase in the basic vote;
(d)  partial delinking of votes from quotas, through 
the addition of a second, population-related, basic 
vote, as proposed by Mirakhor and Zaidi; or
(e)  a dual majority requirement for some or 
all votes, based on (current or improved) 
quota-based votes and votes based democratic 
principles.
Most combinations of these options would also 
be feasible.
As discussed above, the strongest of these op-
tions, in terms of increasing the votes of developing 
countries as a whole, and of most individual countries 
are those involving the use of population ((b) and 
(d)). These also have the advantage over the use of 
the Purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates 
that data problems provide a limited defence. 
A dual majority requirement is very much a 
two-edged sword. While it would represent a means 
of preventing the developed countries from imposing 
changes in IMF rules and policies, it would leave in 
place a block on any changes they oppose. This would 
entrench existing policies which have come about 
through the dominance of the developed countries; 
and, more importantly, it would risk legitimising them 
by creating the semblance of democracy.
While including population in the quota (b) 
and adding a population-based basic vote (d) are in 
principle equivalent in terms of their effects on the 
distribution of votes, there is a strong case for the 
latter in the context of a long-term strategy. By es-
tablishing more clearly a duality of the vote between 
democratic and financial dimensions, it becomes 
more difficult for developed countries to justify al-
locating the overwhelming majority of the votes on 
the basis of financial criteria. Thus, once the principle 
was established, it would be a potential thin end of 
a wedge, providing the opportunity to increase the 
weight given to the democratic options in succes-
sive quota reviews. (It would be highly desirable 
also to allow the democratic vote to be increased in 
subsequent reviews without an amendment of the 
articles.) 
It should be possible, over time, to push towards 
equality between the democratic and financial princi-
ples. If basic and population-related votes were kept 
separate, it might even be possible to push towards 
one-third of the vote being determined by each of 
the three principles, even without challenging the 
inclusion of an economic weighted component in 
the vote. 
This represents a significant case for treating a 
population-related vote as additional to the basic vote 
as currently defined; and this may in turn suggest the 
use of a vote directly proportional to population rather 
than a non-linear function, as the latter is designed 
to incorporate the basic vote principle of provid-
ing a larger vote, relative to population, for smaller 
countries. However in the event of a transition to an 
entirely democratic basis, a non-linear function (e.g. 
square root) of population would remain preferable 
to a basic vote plus population approach.
15.  Conclusion
There is both a pressing need for fundamental 
reform to the IMF’s voting system, and a very strong 
justification for it on a number of grounds. The cur-
rent circumstances also present a rare opportunity 
to achieve at least some immediate change, due to 
the combination of the current quota review with the 
Fund’s current financial position, the position of the 
major “emerging market” economies and the current 
political climate. 
However, the effect of reform will be at best lim-
ited unless the link between IMF votes and economic 
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entirely broken; and securing substantial change will 
remain a slow process. This means that the current 
opportunity needs to be viewed strategically, as part 
of a long-term process.
If it is to be successful, such a strategic approach 
will require a strong degree of solidarity among 
developing country governments, to combine their 
political (and economic) strengths. This requires the 
development, both of a common demand, and of a 
common fall-back strategy.
This paper has proposed, as a common demand 
and long-term objective, the complete separation of 
voting weights in the IMF from financial contribu-
tions and access to Fund resources; and the basis of 
votes exclusively on democratic (i.e. one-country-
one-vote and/or population-related) principles, in 
such a way that votes increase less than proportion-
ally with population. It has also proposed arguments 
to justify such a demand; and it has identified the 
square-root of population as the most promising 
option for such an initial demand, in terms of its ef-
fects on the distribution of votes and its potential for 
developing-country solidarity. 
As a common fall-back, the paper has proposed 
supplementing the existing basic vote with a second 
basic vote, directly proportional to population. Once 
established, it is proposed that the expansion of the 
basic vote and the population-weighted vote, in par-
allel, should be a common objective of developing 
country governments in quota reviews. The square 
root of population would then be applicable only 
in the event of the complete removal of economic 
weighting.
There is, of course, no guarantee of success – not 
least because of the ability of the developed countries 
to use their weighted votes to block any reduction of 
their power. However, by providing a strong moral 
case, based on principles well understood and widely 
supported by the public in developed countries, this 
provides the best option for tackling the one way in 
which opposition can be overcome: through pressure 
on developed country governments from their own 
electorates, opinion formers and pressure groups. 
This will be further enhanced, at least in the current 
Quota Review, by the existence of a credible threat 
that some or all developing countries may leave the 
Fund and establish their own parallel arrangements if 
the problem is not resolved to their satisfaction.
Notes
 1  The term “developed countries” is used throughout to 
mean the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand. The term “high-income coun-
tries” is used according to the World Bank definition. Other 
countries/economies in this category include Hong Kong 
(China), Israel, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Macao 
(China), Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia and the United 
Arab Emirates.
 2  The Fund’s 45 founder members comprised 17 developed 
countries (accounting for 80.4 per cent of quotas), 19 coun-
tries in Latin America, and three each in Asia, sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle East. 
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